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ABSTRACT
Numerous public education policy proposals, such as tuition
tax credits and vouchers, aim to stimulate competition
between public and private education by encouraging
enrollment in private schools. This competition, based on
the quality of education, is thought to force public
schools to raise the level of education they provide.
This study evaluated the assumption that the public and
private sectors of education operate in a competitive
relationship. The historical tradition of public and
private education, social policies evolving from that
tradition and empirical data from 91 Massachusetts
communities provided the information for the analysis. The
results suggest that the assumption of a competitive
relationship is not warranted. The level of participation
of communnity residents in public or private schools does
not appear to be a significant factor in the strength or
quality of the "competing" institution.
Historical tradition and social policy support the idea
that education is currrently valued more as a private than
a public good and, consequently, becomes a desirable item
for which individuals are willing to compete. Those able
to compete successfully have used the public institution to
obtain a high quality education. Implicit social policies
such as tax deductions have rewarded the successful
competitors by distributing further benefits from public
resources.
Thus, dividing the educational institution into public and
private sectors distorts the reality of how educational
benefits are distributed. Rather, wealth facilitates
admission to both high quality private and high quality
public schools. The current policy proposals do not appear
to be founded on reasonable assumptions and, therefore, are
unlikely to produce the intended outcomes.
Thesis Supervisor: Suzann Thomas-Buckle
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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I. Introduction
In a seemingly abrupt reversal, public education, the
solution to the problem of the 1960's has evolved into the
the problem of the 1980's. Two beliefs are commonly
expressed: (1) public schools are inadequate; and (2)
private schools offer a better quality education.
Observers recite a litany of deficiencies in the public
schools. The recurrent problems of low test scores and poor
basic skills among public school students have dominated
discussions of public education. The public perceives that
students lack basic skills, that illiteracy is increasing,
and that the atmosphere in which public education occurs is
chaotic, undisciplined and, in some cases, unsafe. The
needs of the high technology economy of the 1980's are
thought to surpass the ability of the public schools to
meet them. In particular, the shortage of mathematics and
science teachers seems to confirm the fear that, in its
current state, public education will be inadequate to the
task of preparing students for life in the high technology
era.
These concerns have apparently reached the crisis
point. The 20-year decline in test scores now serves as
supporting evidence for the conclusion of the report by the
President's Commission on Excellence, that "If an
unfriendly power had attempted to impose on Americans the
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mediocre educational performance that exists today we might
well have viewed it as an act of war." 1
The belief that a poor quality public educational
system has placed the country "at risk" 2 should result in
discussion about how to define the education problem before
considering what remedies are appropriate, since the
particular definition of the problem tends to incorporate
an implicit remedial policy. For example, to those who see
the problem of public education as a lack of rigorous
standards, the obvious solution is to raise standards.
Basic skills and competency testing programs evolve from
this construction of the public education problem. Another
frequently offered explanation of the "failure" of public
education is the poor quality of teachers. Critics offer
several reasons for the decline in teacher performance:
The existence of better opportunities in other careers,
particularly for women; union pressure on issues such as
seniority; and problems with teacher training programs.
Dismantling or weakening the seniority rights and proposals
for implementing merit pay structures appear frequently as
policy prescriptions for the problem constructed in this
way. In addition, reassessment and even radical overhaul
of teacher training programs are occurring in many states.
Higher standards for students preparing to teach are
advanced to address the "problem" of incompetent teachers.
A more global explanation of the public school problem
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centers on the attempts made in the 1960's and 1970's to
improve equality of educational opportunity. The belief
that emphasizing equality in public education necessarily
reduces rigor and excellence is an element of most policy
analyses and proposals. Some view the conflict as
insurmountable. "The aim of the common schools is
egalitarian. That, to many is its virtue. It is also its
downfall in terms of educational quality." 3 Even reformers
who devoted their energies to promoting the equitable
distribution of educational services are willing to
articulate concern over the tension between equality and
excellence. Walter Garms, a school finance reformer for
over 20 years, recently stated:
We have come a long way toward our goal of
increasing equity. In the process, however, we
may have neglected other values and tasks to too
great an extent. It is time to look more closely
at these other dimensions, arld attempt to achieve
a better balance among them.
Opposition to busing programs and affirmative action, calls
to increase academic requirements and to reduce vocational
and work study programs and competency testing as a
promotion or diploma requirement are manifestations of a
shift in emphasis toward excellence and away from equality.
Even the progress in providing educational services for
handicapped students has been criticized because the
resources required for such programs prevent their
allocation for academic programs.
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The current dissatisfaction with public schools is not
a new phenomenon. The history of public education can be
told as the story of perceived problems, solutions to these
problems and new problems often originating as solutions to
the old ones. 5 Thus, the existence of criticism should not
seem unusual. The problem defined in the 1960's -
inequality of access to educational services - generated
solutions to eliminate the inequality. To a large extent
these remedies succeeded. In terms of the equality-of-
access criterion, the performance of public education
between 1965 and 1980 was outstanding. In 1979, 74% of the
17-year-olds graduated from high school, a substantial
increase over 1910 when only 9% earned a diploma.6
However, solutions that succeed in that magnitude are
likely to become problems themselves. The increase in
school population expanded the range of students in high
school programs. Consequently, curriculum revisions were
produced to accomodate these students, some would say to
the detriment of academic standards and quality of output.
Thus, the schools' "solution" to the problem of inequality
was a major contributor to the current "problem" of poor
quality.
As noted, one important dimension of the quality issue
is the general perception that private education is
"better." The annual Gallup poll shows a continual decline
in confidence in public education over the past five years.
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The same survey indicates that 45% would choose to attend
private schools if they could. The popular press--to the
extent that it reflects public attitudes--also indicates
the tendency of the population to prefer private
education.7
Perhaps for the first time, the current discussion of
remedies to the problem of poor quality education
emphasizes solutions involving private schools. The most
frequently discussed policy proposals at present involve
tuition tax credits or vouchers. Both are designed to
facilitate private school enrollment by individuals and
will affect public schools only if a competition effect
operates. Except for a few proposals to improve education
programs to meet the needs of high technology, very little
effort is being made to devise policies directly aimed at
public education improvement.
Although different interpretations have existed at
various times in history as to the purposes and effects of
education in the United States, there has been a trend
toward expansion of the public school institution. Thus,
the current lack of interest in pursuing remedies within
the public sector marks a significant departure from the
past.8 The President's response to his own Commission's
report was, "I am more convinced than ever that passage of
tuition tax credit legislation is needed now."9
Proposed federal educational policy explicitly aims
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to expand private school enrollment at the expense of the
public schools. The tuition tax credit legislation
proposed in 1982 provided for a $500 federal contribution
(in the form of tax credits) for each private school
student. Federal appropriations for each public school
student amount to only $200.10 A 1983 bill proposes that
the Title I allocation, the largest federal educational
program, be converted to a voucher system.11 Undoubtedly
more of that money would end up in private schools under
that system.
Thus, the solution in good currency, at least in some
circles, rests on a belief in the ability of competition
between public and private schools to improve the quality
of education. Although reliance on the virtues of
competition is certainly not new to education, public
policy to stimulate this competition by strengthening
private schools is. In particular, the absence of any
parallel policy to strengthen public schools, except in
limited ways, seems surprising in the context of the
traditional American faith in public schools.
Thus, the unusual direction of current education
policy, even in the face of a now recognized crisis,
deserves further investigation. Since an important
assumption in many policy proposals is that the
relationship between public and private schools is
characterized by competition, it seems reasonable to
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examine whether that relationship does indeed rest on
competitive elements involving education quality.
Three areas of information are likely to provide
evidence useful in assessing the nature of this
relationship. Examination of historical patterns in the
evolution of public and private education, the character of
policies for both educational sectors and empirical
evidence on current patterns should provide information
with which to test the hypothesis that competition does
characterize the relationship between public and private
education.
Little effort has been made to evaluate whether the
assumption that competition between the two sectors is
occurring. Policy debates rarely address the fundamental
idea on which tuition tax credits or vouchers rest. Nor
does the research community concentrate on this issue.
Rather, most research involves efforts to conduct
comparative quality assessments of public and private
schools, attempting to answer the question, "Are private
schools better?" and occasionally, "Why are they better?"
The relationship between the two does not receive more
attention than this and, often, the true emphasis is on the
private rather than the public sector.
Thus, this study departs from the usual debates on the
issue of what is appropriate policy for public and private
schools. Instead, the goal is to examine the relationship
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between the public and private educational sectors, using
historical and empirical evidence, to determine whether the
existence of a competitive relationship is obvious. If
such a relationship does operate, perhaps policy proposals
are correctly formulated; if it does not, a reevaluation of
their purposes and effects seems necessary.
II. Historical Analysis
Before embarking on the analysis of the evidence, it
is essential to discuss two beliefs that help to frame the
direction of the study. First is the belief that the
educational institution in the United States consists of
two distinct sectors: public and private schools. This
distinction is thought to be clearly marked by the
different sources of control and funding for each sector.
Public schools, according to this belief, are now and have
always been supported by public funds, controlled by
elected public officials, and available to all at no cost
to the students. Private schools, in contrast, come from a
tradition of private support, and tuition fees for students
and private control. Many believe that the history of this
model of education parallels the founding of the nation.
An additional characteristic of the public/private
distinction is based on the non-sectarian nature of public
education. Most believe that a long-standing constitutional
separation of church and state clearly prohibits any
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involvement of the government in religious private
education. This prohibition is often thought to have
existed since the earliest days of the republic.
Generally, Americans regard this dichotomy as clearly
defined and applicable to the similarly clear distinction
between public and private education.
The second important idea derives from that fact that
education has played a prominent role in many social reform
movements that have occurred throughout the history of the
United States. The reliance on education to accomplish
social change stems from the belief that, as David Cohen
describes it, "Education...is in many respects the nearest
thing we have to a faith." 1 2 As a result, education is
relied upon to support and produce a wide variety of public
benefits, resulting in a shifting definition of the purpose
of education. Initially, the reliance of a democracy on
its educational institutions to provide an informed
electorate served as an important justification for the
creation of an educational system. When pressed, Americans
can generally recite a reasonable facsimile of this
explanation of the purpose of education.
The political purpose of education shifted somewhat as
the goals of the nation changed from establishing its
political system to achieving industrial power. The
underlying justification for the educational institution
evolved into providing the trained individuals essential,
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not necessarily for a democracy, but for an industrial
giant.
Despite their substantially different contents, both
the political and economic justifications for education
recognize the public benefits of education. Today, the
economic justification has come to dominate as America
worries about its ability to compete in international
markets. Public belief in the economic justification for
education is thus a powerful element of the present version
of faith in the religion of education.
A third theme operating within the idea that education
is essential to a democracy rests on its ability to improve
the degree of equality in the society. History records any
number of examples of the link between education and
equality. Faith in the ability of education to achieve an
equitable society explains why:
[I]t is no accident that the longest, hardest and
most unending battles in the.. .movement for black
civil rights occurred around schools, rather than
lunch counters, public parks, or voting booths--
even though the latter were sljely more important
in purely instrumental terms.
Indeed, American faith in the power of education has
remained strong throughout the 200 years of the country's
history. The fundamentality of this belief leads to
another strongly held notion--that a clear consensus of
support for public education has a long history in the
United States. An institution so obviously essential to so
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many social benefits must have evolved with little
controversy (although the definition of which benefits to
pursue may well have caused conflicts).
These two beliefs contribute to an understanding of
the meaning of social phenomena related to education and,
in particular, the public-private school relationship. In
order to get at that meaning, the historical context of the
evolution of these ideas is useful to explore. In
addition, the historical pattern of the relationship
between public and private schools helps to understand the
nature of the relationship today. The importance of an
historical perspective stems from the idea that:
[T]he institution and culture of schools today
are in many respects simply the cold and hardened
organizational results of myths and rituals
beli ed and cultivated several generations
ago.
A. The Distinction Betweeen Public and Private Education
The concept of public education has, in fact, shifted
over the course of American history. Originally "public"
education had a meaning very different from what the notion
defines today. For example, the charter of Philips Andover
Academy asserts the intention to establish a "public free
school or academy." 1 5 Since today many regard Philips
Andover as the quintessential private school, the
definitional shift seems clear.
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In the Colonial period no formal school organizations
existed. Rather, as Carl Kaestle summarizes:
Elementary education among white Americans was
accomplished through parental initiative and
informal local control of institutions. In a few
cases, New England colonial legislatures tried to
ensure that towns would provide schools or that
parents would not neglect their children's
education, but these laws were weakly enforced. 1 6
Education was defined as a private responsibility; parents
were assigned the role of arranging for their children's
schooling.
At various times and in various regions, schooling
took different forms. One type involved the hiring of a
private master by an individual family, a group of families
or a community. 1 7 Private venture schools, established by
a teacher who "tried to make a living by selling his
instructional wares for a fee," 1 8 often provided
rudimentary skills. Another educational form was the
endowed school established by gift or bequest. This model
existed in Connecticut as early as 1657.19 Typically the
control of the endowment was given to local public
officials, a practice which changed significantly after the
colonial period.
Variations of these models evolved in different
regions and differences emerged even among towns in the
same area. As Lawrence Cremin describes the situation:
It is difficult to generalize with any degree of
precision about the extent of schooling in
provincial America, largely because of the
phenomenal variation in types and modes of
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instruction and the consequent difficulty of
determining exactly what to call a school. We do
know.. .that there were individual teachers of
reading, writing, ciphering, grammar,
bookkeeping, surveying, navigation, fencing,
dancing, music, modern languages, embroidery, and
every conceivable combination of these and other
subjects; that these teachers taught part time
and full time, by day and by evening, in their
homes, in other people's homes, in rented rooms,
in churches and meeting houses, in abandoned
buildings, and in buildings erected especially
for their use; that they were self employed and
employed by others (acting as individuals or
through self-constituted, self-perpetuating or
elected boards); and that they were paid with
funds obtained from employees, patrons,
subscriptions, lotteries, endowments, tuition
rates and taxes. The combinations and
permutations were legion, and the larger and more
heterogeneous the community, the greater the0
latitude and diversity of the arrangements.
Clearly, any attempt to categorize colonial education
offerings into public and private using today's distinctive
characteristics seems inapprpriate. In some cases, private
funds donated to establish schools were controlled by
public authorities. In other instances, public money was
allocated to institutions controlled and generally funded
by private groups. The present assumption that public
education should be entirely free to all who attend did not
exist in early educational practice. As Kaestle points
out, "Nowhere was schooling entirely tax-supported.. ."21
and, therefore, nowhere was it entirely free to those
attending. Tuition fees provided support for almost any
type of school.
Further, the interpretations given to school labels
such as "public," "private," "free school" and "academy"
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were by no means consistent. Historians continue to debate
how colonial Americans defined these terms, which were used
frequently and inconsistentlyin records of the proceedings
of colonial towns. For example, according to Cremin,
quoting from a study of the Massachusetts Bay Colony:
[I]n Roxbury, the terms 'free' meant free to the
children of subscribers, in Salem free to all
poor children, in Ipswich free to a limited
number of cglldren and in Dedham, free to all
children...
The concepts of "public" and "private" also present
problems of definition. One perspective defined private
education as occurring individually rather than in a group,
much along the model of a private tutor. 2 3 Another view
saw a private school "as a school run for profit of the
teacher as a business venture." 2 4 The term "public school"
or "town school" sometimes meant that the school enrollment
was not restricted to a particular group; anyone had the
right to enroll. 2 5 However, this did not imply that
tuition would be free. In other usage, moreover, almost all
types of schooling, including private tutoring, were
considered to be public because they served the public
interest.2 6
The sectarian dichotomy is also irrelevant to the
colonial educational experience. All education included
religious instruction among its primary purposes and, since
religious beliefs were more homogeneous than today,
conflicts about religious content of schooling tended to be
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intra-denominational.
The diverse educational offerings established in the
colonial era provided a number of different models from
which the educational system of the new nation would
evolve. Most historians find little change in these models
as a consequence of the Revolutionary War.2 7 The early
19th century, however, was to produce substantial changes
in American education. Many view this period as having
given rise to the public school in the contemporary sense--
publicly supported and controlled and free to all.2 8
Others do not agree, however, that this development was
complete by that time. One study has concluded:
[Tihe public elementary school even in the New
England States is of late origin, since tuition
rates were not abolished universally until after
the Civil War and, in some areas of the South, it
would arise much later since general local
taxation for free elementary education was firmly
establis d only in the late 19th or early 20th
century.
Another work, undertaken in 1875, states that "Previous to
1868, there were in the State of Pennsylvania, some twenty-
four districts which had refused or neglected to supply
public schools." 3 0 These two observations contradict the
general assumption that the framework for a free public
education system was in place by 1850. Kaestle and
Vinoskis, in describing the educational system in
Massachusetts during this period, state that "Generally
various levels and types of school were offered to a
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greater or lesser degree by means of a combination of
parental and governmental initiatives." 3 1
Although regional differences certainly existed, most
19th century urban schooling fit into two categories:
charity schools, sometimes in the form of Sunday schools;
and non-charity schools, which could also be termed "pay
schools." Charity schools in major urban areas developed
from the concern that a rudimentary education should be
provided for those unable to pay tuition fees.
Philanthropic efforts on behalf of the poor existed even
during colonial times, often provided by churches to their
members. By the beginning of the 19th century, however,
these efforts had expanded to non-denominational schools
for the urban poor.
Both sectarian and non-sectarian versions of charity
schools received subsidies from the government. In some
cases, government subsidy was available only to charity
schools. For example, Pennsylvania's constitution and
subsequent legislation allowed public support of schools
for the poor only. 3 2 New York City allocated public monies
to denominational charity schools until 1825 when the Free
School Society persuaded the State to assign the entire
responsibility for the education of the poor to one non-
denominational organization, which evolved into the Public
School Society. 3 3 Even in Boston, charity schools played
an important role. Prior to the decision to offer free
18
primary schools so that all would be eligible to attend the
public grammar schools, denominational charity schools
filled the education gap for the poor. As Schultz
comments, "For many poor children the charity schools
offered the only available means of instuction." 3 4
Non-charity urban schools offered education on a
tuition basis for most of those who attended school. A
variety of these schools operated in the free market.
Because of the tuition charges common to these schools,
contemporary observors classify them as private. However,
research into the enrollment patterns of these schools has
led some to conclude that this classification is not
appropriate. First, the rates charged were not high and,
therefore, the enrollment was not exclusively affluent.3 5
Second, these schools were eligible in some areas to
receive government subsidy. 3 6 Clearly the blurred
distinction between public and private continued into the
19th century. The system of charity and pay schools in
urban areas cannot be said to correspond to the present
distinction between public and private education. Indeed,
Kaestle describes both the pay and the charity schools of
New York as "the public school system." 3 7
Provision for schooling followed a very different
pattern in rural areas. "[I]n small towns and rural
villages there was relatively little independent
entreprenurial schooling...."3 8 Size and density of the
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population typically supported only a single school,
sometimes called a town or a district school and, at
another level, an academy. Such schools incorporated
elements of both public and private schools. The chief
source of financial support was the rate bill, a user fee
assessed on the basis of the number of days of a student's
attendance. In addition, academies received some
governmental subsidy and made scholorship aid available to
the poor. Incorporated academies were chartered by the
state and were thus considered to be public in that they
were created by public policy or a decision. 3 9
The academies flourished during the time between the
Revolution and the Civil War. One estimate made by Henry
Barnard reported 6000 academies in the United States in
1850.40 This is not to say that academies were a uniform
educational institution. They existed in a wide variety of
forms and did not encompass any well-defined phase of
educational development. 4 1 When their dominance began to
wane, some converted into colleges (Mt. Holyoke, for
example) while others became public high schools. 4 2
The position of the academies in the 19th century
again points out the inappropriateness of attempting to
impose current distinctions betweeb public and private
schools on the past. Americans in the 1800's were
apparently satisfied to give a small amount of support to
their schools; to allow them to charge tuition, which
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provided the bulk of their funding; to grant control to a
private, self-perpetuating group; and then to consider the
school public.
Although the academy was often accepted as a public
school, that acceptance was not strong enough to counter
the efforts of the reformers who sought to establish a
free, state-controlled education system. The academy,
financed by rate bills and privately controlled, did not
satisfy their goals. Thus, in part due to the success of
men like Horace Mann, the academies declined as the
contemporary public school system evolved. However, in
some rural areas, the academy system continued, even after
rate bills were abolished.43
From this rather complicated set of educational
arrangements, a general system of public education emerged
by some point in the late 19th century. However, the
public education system continued to rely on private
initiatives to solve particular problems. Two educational
innovations--kindergarten and vocational education--
illustrate that the distinction between public and private
education was not entirely clear even by the 20th century.
Pre-school education was a topic of controversey from
the early stages of the development of American education.
Rural district schools often enrolled children as young as
three. 4 4 Educators throughout the reform period debated
the relative merits of various school starting ages.
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Eventually, the proponents of early education lost out. In
the late 1800's, however, interest in pre-school education
was cultivated by the impact of the philosophy of Hall from
Germany. Initially, kindergartens, following the child-
study theories of G> Stanley Hall, were established
primarily for the affluent because of their rather
substantial tuition charges ($60 - $100 per year). 4 5
Urban reformers seized on the kindergarten concept as an
ideal way to counteract the negative effects of the poor
environment of the slum child. However, the public schools
were not eager to accept the additional burden of a longer
public education career. Thus, kindergartens for the poor
were established as charity institutions. In Boston,
"preschooling before 1887 remained almost exclusively a
philanthropic-social settlement activity..." 4 6  Eventually,
as in the case of the earlier charity schools, the public
institution took over the responsibilities of funding and
controlling pre-school education. Similar patterns of
public assumption of philanthropic endeavors occurred in
other Massachusetts towns.
A virtually identical trend appears in the development
of manual education. The first instances of education of
this sort were supported by charitable agencies outside the
public schools. Philanthropic funding of manual education
schools was widespread throughout Massachusetts. Lacking a
clear ideology to support public responsibility for all
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educational programs, and suffering from financial
constraints, cities and towns were eager to accept the
contributions of wealthy benefactors. An example was the
Manual Training High School, located in Cambridge,
Massachusetts and funded by Frederick Rindge. Despite the
seemingly obvious private character of this school, the
Cambridge School Committee definitely viewed the
institution as public, as is clear from their 1895 report:
Although the manual training school is supported
by private munificence and the mechanical work is
carried on under the direction of a
superintendent responsible only to the founder,
it is, nevertheless, in its essential features, a
part of the public school system. All who take
the regular course are enrolled as pupils of the
English High School and their academic work is
carried on unde 7 the direction of the principal
of that school.
The school existed within this framework for ten years
before the School Committee assumed complete responsibility
in 1899.
Fletcher Swift lists nine different funding sources
for education that were employed during the early 19th
century: (1) appropriations; (2) rate bills; (3) local tax
on real and personal property; (4) taxes on banks; (5)
licenses fees and taxes on occupations and on commodities;
(6) lotteries; (7) land rates; (8) gifts and bequests; and
(9) permanent funds. 4 8 States and localities used a
combination of these methods to support schooling.
Clearly, 19th century Americans did not distinguish between
public and private sources of funding. Gifts and bequests
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were considered legitimate ways to fund schools as were
lotteries and property taxes.
Although some instances of general taxation for
education existed in the Colonial period, the practice did
not become a well-engrained feature of public education
until well after the Civil War. Other methods of funding
played substantial roles in supporting education. For
example, rate bills, a form of private support, supplied
more revenue than all public monies in New York State prior
to 1840.49 When rate bills were finally abolished in
Conneticut in 1868, officials estimated that 6,000 students
had been kept out of school due to insufficient funds. 5 0
Further, this type of funding remained in effect across the
United States for much longer than is commonly assumed.
Although Massachusetts abolished rate bills in 1827, Utah
continued to allow them until 1890.51
Implicit in the reformers quest for a free public
education was a more systematized, stable funding
mechanism. Rate bills, by definition, were dependent on
the number of students and the number of days they
attended. They were, therefore, not reliable sources of
funding. Some states established more or less permanent
state school funds at various times, but the impact of this
type of support was not large. In 1839, Massachusetts'
state fund provided only 1.6% of school expenditures. 5 2
However, in the view of some, the state funds were
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instrumental in bridging the gap between the haphazard
primarily private system of funding and the system of
general taxation which has become an essential component of
American public education. One observor describes the
situation in Indiana in 1851:
[Ilt was this fund that sustained public schools
and gradually mollified and molded public
sentiment until a law permitting local taxation
for all classes of school expenditures, a law at
one time declared unconstitut nal, was passed a
second time and sustained....
Establishment of the principle and practice of funding
education by general taxation thus was a very gradual
process. This process usually included three stages,
although time frames for each differed widely. First,
members of a community instituted a local tax to fund, in
part, their educational endeavors. Second, a provision for
general taxation by communities was made at the state
level. Finally, taxation to support schools became
compulsory under state law. In Massachusetts, step two was
accomplished by 1647, however, compulsory taxation was not
instituted until 1827.54
Prior to the establishment of free education supported
by general taxation, the majority of students attended
private schools which would toady be considered private, in
part because schools with the characteristics of today's
public schools existed only for the poor. The following
table provides available statistics for the percentage of
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school enrollment in several cities, using current
definitions of "public" and "private":
Town Year % Private
Salem,MA 1820 50%
Boston,MA 1817 61.8%
New York, NY 1829 62%
Milwaukee,WI 1845 61%
Washington,DC 1857 68%
Private schools were clearly the dominant educational
institution in these cities at these particular times.
Charity schools served only the indigent; all others had to
find the means to provide education individually. Even in
Boston, the home of one of the most prominent reformers,
Horace Mann, the nature of the public education system
presented serious obstacles that prevented many students
from attending. Boston has received substantial
recognition for extablishing a public education system as
early as the Colonial Period, and the city did offer a free
grammar school education pursuant to the Education Act of
1789.56 However, the grammar schools required that
students be able to read and write before entering. Thus,
because no free primary schools existed to provide training
in these skills, this requirement "effectively made private
schooling in one form or another an adjunct to public
education." 5 7 Primary schools, tax-supported and free to
all, were not provided until 1820.58
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Thus, even in places with a reputation for high levels
of government initiative, serious gaps in available
education existed. In towns without such a tradition, the
schooling offered was even less extensive. The town of
Boxford took 16 years and required prodding by the General
Court to establish a school in the town, after a statute
was enacted requiring it do so. 5 9 Clearly, the 19th century
was characterized by only a gradual evolution of support
for the public school.
A dramatic change occurred in private enrollment
figures around the time when provisions for free schooling
were made in each area. The following figures illustrate
this pattern:
Salem, MA 1875 17.9%
Boston, MA 1826 32.5%
Boston, MA 1850 12.2%
New York, NY 1850 18%
Milwaukee, WI 1848 46%
Although clear cause-and-effect relationships are
difficult to determine, the link between the establishment
of free schooling and these enrollment changes seems
strong. For example, the decline in private enrollment in
Boston between 1817 and 1826 from 61.8% to 32.5% is likely
related to the 1820 provision of free primary schools to
teach the skills required for admission to the free grammar
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schools. The strong efforts of reformers to reduce private
enrollment could account for the further decline by 1850.
In Salem, the effect of free high schools on academy
enrollment could similarly explain the drop in private
enrollment from 1825 to 1875.
Regions outside New England established both public
and private schools at later dates, but their enrollment
trends indicate a similar pattern. Kaestle explains the
New York City enrollment shift as "due to the successful
competition of the public schools with the lesser pay
schools." 6 1 It seems reasonable to assert that the
existence of free public schools produced a decline in the
proportion of students attending private insitutitions.
The U.S. School Census of 1850 shows that over 90% of the
nation's students were enrolled in public institutions. 6 2
However, this large shift from private to public
education in the middle 19th century did not constitute the
end of the issue. The establishment of parochial,
primarily Catholic, eduation caused another substantial
shift in the public/private enrollment balance. At the
beginning of the 20th century, many Massachusetts cities,
particularly those with a large immigrant population, had
high private school populations. Of the private school
enrollment, the overwhelming percentage attended parochial
schools. For example, private school enrollment across the
state of Massachusetts increased from 10% in 1870 to 16% in
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1910.63 Enrollment figures64 in several cities showed a
much larger parochial enrollment.
Cambridge 1905 19%
New Bedford 1910 26%
Lawrence 1915 33%
Eventually, parochial enrollment stablized and private
school enrollment showed little substantial change.
The history of public education, however, suggests
that the rate of private school attendance might not be as
critical as the class of people from which this enrollment
came. In the early 19trh century, only children whose
parents had declared themselves to be paupers were
permitted to attend the charity schools. 6 5 A statement of
this nature proved to be a significant obstacle to school
attendance mong the poor. In Boston, attempts to establish
philanthropic charity schools received an indifferent
response. "While the number of impoverished families
increased, those willing to have their children considered
objects fit only for charity did not."6 6
Such an attitude extended to other regions as well.
The Pennsylvania law restricting government education aid
to the poor "immediately stigmatized any person who took
advantage of public schools as one unable to provide for
himself and his family." 6 7 The pauper stigma would
eventuallly contribute to the sense that private education
is to be prefer, as the charity schools evolved into
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contemporary urban public school systems.
However, the stigma associated with the charity
schools involved more than the simple fact that they were
populated by the poor. Faced with the problem of educating
large numbers of students with limited funds, those
operating charity schools seized upon an educational
innovation that would allow large numbers of students to
receive an education at a very small cost. The
Lancasterian or monitorial system required a single teacher
who would oversee the instruction given by monitors, chosen
from the ranks of the students. Thus, the method involved
the poor teaching the poor, with the teacher supervising to
the extent possible. The system claimed to be capable of
handling ratios of one teacher to 500 students. 6 9 Although
other elements of the system were also appealing, the low
cost and the efficiency of the Lancasterian method matched
extremely well with the needs of those attempting to
educate the large number of the urban poor. As Carl
Kaestle observes, "the speed and breadth of its adoption in
American cities was remarkable." 7 0
The implementation of the monitorial system was not
without some opposition. Even at the time, some questioned
its educational merits. Nonetheless, its widespread use in
urban charity schools created a second stigma for those who
had to attend them. Not only were they labelled as
paupers, but the method of instruction they received was
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also clearly considered as suitable only for the poor. In
addition, it was obvious that one teacher for 500 students
was significantly different from the individual tutoring
that only the very wealthiest individuals could afford.
Thus, both in the affluence of its students and in the
quality of its instruction, the charity school occupied a
lower rank in the hierarchy of schooling in the early 19th
century.
The stigma associated with charity schools would not
be of such importance today if these schools had not
evolved into contemporary the public schools in a large
number of cities. In Boston, the charity primary schools
eventually became part of the government-provided grammar
school system. In New York, the Quaker organization which
controlled all government subsidy for charity education
after 1825, renamed itself the Public School Society, and
started accepting non-indigent students. The typical
pattern of this change began with:
...consolidation of various charity schools under
one organization, obtained increased governmental
aid, developed procedures for supervision and
attempted to xpand the schools' c entele beyond
the poor to include all children.
However, the development of these institutions into public
schools did not eliminate the stigma associated with
pauperism and the Lancasterian system. Thus, the tradition
of public schools in this country has, at its roots,
characteristics that would cuase many to view them as
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inferior.
Ironically, the pay schools (private by today's
standards) exhibited a more evenly distributed range of
students than the charity schools. Although no claim can
be made that the range of students in non-charity urban
schools represented the entire socio-economic sector,
Kaestle's data indicate that the schools did serve a
reasonably broad group of students. 7 2 In addition, he
finds evidence that some form of scholarship aid,
consisting of reduction or elimination of fees by the
masters, was given to poor students (arguably without the
same degree of stigma attached to charity school
attendance).73
Kaestle has concluded that, during the era of pay and
charity schooling in New York, the pay school system was
not limited to the wealthy. Examinng records for a charity
and a free school that included fathers' occupations and
tax assesments, he found that "attendance at these schools
(the pay schools) was common to the children of families
with a broad range of income." 7 4 This is not to claim that
the independent pay school system was the solution to the
problem of inequality in America. Kaestle also recognizes
that poor children were very lkely underrepresented in
these schools and that families with the greatest wealth
often employed private tutors or enrolled their children in
boarding schools. However, it does seem legitimate to
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conclude that, if these schools are defined as private,
they did not possess the same sense of exclusiveness in
1779 that the term connotes today.
An educational system with both public and private
sectors has the potential to perpetuate divisions based on
wealth rather than to eliminate them. With the origins of
public education located in stigmatized charity schooling,
a strong possibility existed that the privileged classes
would not wish to participate in "tainted" forms of
education. The switch from private to public eduaction
precipitated by the establishment of free public education
heightened interest in this issue. For example, Horace
Mann exhibited a substantial concern over whether the
wealthy participated in common schools. In his first
report, he argued that:
[P]erhaps a majority of the wealtlhier persons in
the state patronized private schools...and that
practice drew off from the public schools some of
the best scholars an 5 the support of their
influential parents.
This report was written at a time when private school
enrollment in Massachusetts was 13.8% and would decline to
8.4% by 1880. Yet the concern over the enrollment of the
wealthy in private education pervades the reform period.
To some extent, the reformers' emphasis on this issue
was legitimate. Apparently, the affluent did not wish to
receive their schooling in the common schools for a variety
of reasons. In New York, "the public schools attracted
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children predominately from working-class families.... The
wealthy..want to increasingly expensive private schools." 7 7
The overall effect of the establishment of public schools
stigmatized by their pauper character and Lancasterian
instructional method, was that:
[Wihile the rich continued to provide private
education for their children, those with more
limited resources gradually lost their
alternatives to the public schools when the
middle-priced private schools, both independent
and corn ? rate, became more exclusive and
closed.
In Massachusetts, a similar assessment of Mann's efforts is
made:
[W]hat occurred was not then, a victory over
separate elite schooling, as Mann would have
liked, but a conversion of low-priced pay
schools, local academies, and subscription
schools to town-controlled, tax-supported
schools.
Nor did the affluent feel the need to disguise their
attitude. Edward Everett Hale, in his account of his
childhood, stated that "there was no public school of any
lower grade to which my father would have sent me any more
than he would have sent me to jail." 8 0 The Boston Latin
School alone met the requirements of this family's
schooling needs. As others have noted, the Boston Latin
School was uniquely able to entice the children of the
wealthy to attend. Occasionally, other schools were
credited with similar abilities. For example, one visitor
to the United States noted that:
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The high schools of Boston, supported by the
state, are now so well managed, that some of my
friends, who woould grudge no expense to engage
for their sons the best instructors, send their
boys to them as superior to any of the private
institytions supported by the rich at great
cost.
However, it is not clear how act this observation was and,
certainly this effort was less successful in other areas.
As early as 1806, a school committee member in Salem
recognized the difficulty the free public school was having
in attracting upper class students. The free schools "are
admirably supported but the many private schools draw away
all the children of the best families." 8 2 The pattern
extended to areas outside the Northeast as well. An Ohio
school official noted that "a better class of families
would not send their children to public schools." 8 3 Thus
an unanticipated effect of common school reform appeared to
be the addition of a sense of exclusiveness to private
school attendance.
Complicating the effort to improve the quality of
public schools was the fact that private school enrollment
took resources from public schools. In the midst of the
battle to win general taxation for public schools,
reformers eyed the amount of money spent on private
education and reasoned that, if it were allocated to public
schools, as they felt the wealthy were resisting, the
quality of public schools would be sufficient to attract
the affluent into the public schools. John Pierce saw a
35
direct relationship between expenditures on private
education and expenditures on, and therefore the quality
of, public education. "In those towns where private
seminaries have been located and well sustained, the free
schools will be found, without exception, to be in a
miserable condition." 8 4 The belief was strong that, with
sufficient resources, public schools could offer an
education of high enough quality to induce the affluent to
participate.
However, an alternative cause and effect relationship
can be suggested. In his study of the development of free
education in Connecticut, Arthur Mead asserts that
"inadequate public funding of the school system which
necessitated rate-bills drove the wealthy out of the school
system." 8 5 He concludes that an important result of the
abolition of rate bills was the decrease in private
schools.
In part, this argument sees the process as circular:
Low public support produced low quality education; the
affluent, thus unwilling to attend public schools, opted
for private education; and, as a result, they were not
interested in supporting public education. Although the
view was not well-formulated in the 19th century, it
clearly operated in the minds of some advocates of free
public education.
Thus, the public assumption of the responsibility for
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education was a long process, involving conflicts and
disputes with strong opinions on all sides. As Cremin has
noted, "One of the most bitter struggles in securing public
common schools was the struggle for public support." 8 6
Eventually this formulation of the issue dominated the
debate. However, the reduction of the conflict to this
fiscal issue should not lead to the conclusion that the
only problem was how to pay for something that everyone
agreed the country needed. Disagreements about the
importance of education did not spring up only when funding
became an issue.
Thus, an historical overview of the development of the
public and private educational institutions suggests two
primary conclusions. First, the current definitions of
public and private education do not have a strong
historical tradition. Even into the 20th century, the
record shows a great deal of uncertainty, tension and
redefinition surrounding notions of public and private
schools. Second, the various sectors of education that did
exist exhibited some aspects of a competitive relationship,
particularly between charity and pay schools, which was
founded, to some extent, on quality.
B. American Faith in Public Education
The belief in public education as a means of producing
public benefits has served as a powerful philosophical
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foundation for public education. David Cohen views the
events in this evolution
...partly as outgrowths of the old and abiding
American enthusiasm for education.... Americans
undertook public education in part because
education had always been an American passion.
And when America became a political democracy,
dependent upog7an informed citizenry, passion
became faith.
The belief has adapted to changing circumstances, but still
retains some fundamental ideas. For example, it logically
supports the sense that public education enjoys a consensus
rare in American history. Granting that some disagreement
over the purposes and effects of education would naturally
occur, the belief suggests that opposition to public
education comes very close to opposition to democracy.
Yet, even in the early colonial period, divergent
ideas about the institution of education were clear. These
differences were reflected in two responses made by the
Governors of Virginia and Connecticut in reply to the same
question. The governor of Virginia stated, "I thank God
there are no free schools or printing presses, and I hope
we shall not have, these hundred years." In contrast, the
governor of Connecticut answered, "One fourth the annual
revenue of the colony is laid out in maintainng free
schools for the education of our children."8 8 Thus, from
the earliest beginnings of the country, individuals
disagreed about the appropriate role of public education.
Further, as the struggle to secure funding by general
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taxation indicates, support for public education has not
been consistently strong. Certainly no public consus
existed that a system of tax support for schools was
essential. As Sizer points out:
The American was for many things, but he was not
for being taxed.... [H]e believed strongly
enough in education to dignify a private venture
with a charter and to set it on its way with an
initigf grant of money or more usually, of
land.
Nor should the strength of this opposition be
underestimated. Many historians have pointed out that
"public sentiment respecting the establishment of free
schools ranged all the way from indifference, disbelief and
contempt, to open hostility."9 0 Often when state funds
were available on a matching basis to communities, towns
would decide not to participate and, therefore, neither
receive nor allocate funds for the provision of
education. 9 1 The free public education system thus appears
not to have been a fundamental tenet of American democracy.
One way to analyze the differences in beliefs about
education is within the framework of the public and private
benefits assigned to education and public and private
responsibility for providing education. The two ideas are
not necessarily complementary. W. Norton Grubb and Marvin
Lazerson describe the source of the conflict:
The public responsibilities are vast: developing
human capacities, creating a common set of
values, preparing a literate and critical
citizenry, providing equality of opportunity,
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moving children and youth from their families
into the larger social world, and serving as the
prime avenue to occupation, income and status.
In their managerial roles, however, parents have
assumed that public schooling should be used for
private ends: to ensure their own ethnic or
religious values, to reaffirm childrearing as a
familial rather than a social responsibility, and
above all-to ensure the success of their own
children.
In the early history of the country, for example, although
education was often perceived to have primarily public
benefits, the responsibility for its provision was
primarily private. Today, in contrast, it can be argued
that the private benefits of education dominate, but that
the responsibility is assigned to the public.
Differences in notions about education have surfaced
throughout the country's history. Even during the reform
period, and perhaps particularly then, individuals and
communities expressed widely divergent beliefs. At that
time, while one observer was noting that "the common school
system of New England is its pride and strength; and the
public schools of Boston are the richest jewel in its
crown,"9 3 the Town of Boxford provided only the barest
minimum of an education at public expense.94 Clearly such
an accolade did not apply to this town.
Regional differences were no less significant. In
1829, a letter to a Raleigh, North Carolina newspaper
contained advice to the legislature:
[I]t is possible, but not very likely I confess,
that you may be solicited to take some steps with
regard to the establishement among us of common
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schools. Should so ridiculous a measure be
propounded to you, you will unquestionably, for
you own interest, as well as that of your
constituents, treat it with the same contemptuous
neglect which it has ever been met heretofore.
Gentlemen, I hope you do not conceive it at all
necessary, that egrybody should be able to read,
write and cipher.
So much for democratic ideals of an educated citizenry and
equality! Evidence such as this may not be proof of
invidious rejection of the principles upon which this
country was supposedly founded, but it does show that such
principles were not so clearly at the foundation of the
nation.
Despite different constructions of the problem and
different justifications, many groups settled on publicly
funded common schools as a remedy for their selected social
problem. As the purpose of education passed beyond the
religious and moral goals, advocates of expanding the
public institution identified many benefits schooling could
arguably provide. David Cohen has explored the unlikely
combination of those advocating education as a form of
social control with those who, in support of common
schools, viewed the institution as a means of liberation. 9 6
Whether the benefits being advocated by those groups and
others were thought to be public or private was not
entirely clear. As discussed previously, public and
private distinctions were changing and, in some cases, the
benefits described could fit into either category.
However, the public interest to be served by an expanded
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educational system did provide a substantial share of its
justification.
The definition of the public interest, of course,
reflected a wide range of beliefs. For example, Horace
Mann, in the face of urban instability, emphasized the need
for social cohesion, viewing public education as "the
balance wheel of the social machinery." 9 7 In his flowery
style, he articluated precisely what schooling could do to
improve this balance:
The common school is a preventive and an
antidote.... [E]xpanded to its capabilities, let
it be worked with the efficiency of which it is
susceptible, and nine-tenths of the crimes in the
penal code would become obsolete; the long
catalogue of human ills would be abridged, men
would walk more safely by day, every pillow would
be more inviolable by night; property, life and
character held by a stronger tenure; al 8rational
hopes respecting the future brightened.
A slightly different notion of the public interest
focussed on the expanding presence of the immigrant poor,
and expressed the public benefit goal of education "to
train up all the children, within its jurisdiction, to be
intelligent, virtuous, patriotic American citizens." 9 9 In
this way, the desire for social stability was linked with
the political justification that an educated population is
essential to a democracy (a notion based on Jefferson's
educational plan--one never approved by the Virginia
legislature). 1 0 0 Francis Adams, in 1875, summarized the
same principle, "In a government where every citizen has a
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voice, education must be co-extensive with universal
suffrage."101 The writings of the reformers and other
supporters of public eduation abound with grand statements
about the public good to be served by providing education.
However, without great difficulty, it is posible to
assess such statements as expressing private rather than
public benefits. Daniel Webster's view of education, "as a
wise and liberal system of police, by which property, and
life, and the peace of society are assured,"1 02 lists two
rather private benefits first and mentions the societal
goal last. Stanley Schultz, in discussing those who
petitioned for the establishment of free primary schools in
Boston in 1820, commented, "The signers of the petition
were not completely benevolent in motive. They were
concerned as much with their private tranquility as with
public duty." 1 0 3 The emphasis on public benefits,
nonetheless, clearly dominated evaluation of the reformers'
efforts. 1 0 4 Two often-cited types of private educational
benefits were virtually absent from the arguments: personal
economic gain and intellectual improvement.
Francis Adams has observed that, "the gauge of public
interest in the system is the burden of taxation which the
people are willing to bear for its maintenance." 1 0 5 Using
this measure, the record indicates that the interest was
not strong:
To assert the social importance of formal
education was one thing, to believe that the
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schools were important enough to make them a
public responsi lity, funded by tax dollars, was
quite another.
Nonetheless, many asserted the public duty associated with
education, recognizing that private responsibility was not
adequate to the task:
The education of the people is regarded in the
United States as the first and most important
interest of society, and as a work too gigantic
for private capital, too momentuous for the
mischances of private judgment....
[A]ccordingly, it has been founded upon the most
permanent and immovable basis, instead of being
left to the shifting ground of private
benevolence or caprice or even to that self-
interest which 187so strong a motive power in
modern society.
Ironically, for a good part of the nation's history and, to
some degree, even when this comment was written in 1875,
education was left to "private benevolence" and "self-
interest."
Thus, in general, the advocates of education expressed
belief in the importance of the public benefits schooling
produced and the need for the public assumption of the
responsibility for providing it. Even thoughh closer
examination indicates that these public benefits have
somewhat private aspects and that, despite the reformers,
public assumption often stopped short of general taxation,
the superficial content of these arguments supports the
conclusion that public benefits and responsibility were
dominant.
In the late 19th century, an increased emphasis on
44
education as a means to economic gain developed. In this
new perspective, education ws seen as providing both public
and private economic benefits. According to David Cohen,
this view was reflected in:
...studies of the money value of schooling, an
avalanche of high school vocational courses, and
the rapid replacement of apprenticeship by
schooling in any number of professional fields.
There was virtually a religious commitment to the
idea that fromal schooling held the key to
success in an1 creasingly technological
civilization.
The influence of economic gains on social policy for both
public and private education would be substantial from the
beginning of the 20th century to the present, where it
appears to be the primary justification for either public
or private investment in education.
Another strain of the arguments for pubic assumption
of education was the concern over the gap between rich and
poor and the potential of education to narrow it. In some
instances, the specific focus of this "egaliatarian"
argument was not technically the establishment of public
schools but rather the disestablishment of private schools,
considered to be bastions of the wealthy and the elite.
According to this view, private schools for the wealthy
would harm not only the democracy and the society, but the
public schools as well. In addition, a great deal of
comment and concern was evoked over the extent to which it
was the wealthy who opted for other than the public
schools. Horace Mann summed up his view of this situation
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in his First Report:
opposed to this class, who tolerate from apathy,
a depression in the common schools, there is
another class who affix so high a value upon the
culture of their children, and understand as well
the necessity of a skillful preparatioon of means
for its bestowment, that they turn away from
common schools, in their depressed state, and
seek, elsewhere, thjo1elp of a more enlarged and
thorough education.
The private benefits of education seem to prevail in Mann's
assessment. In many ways, the debate could be transplanted
to the present with little adjustment of detail.
The scope of this argument extends over a number of
issues. First, the existence of private schools ws argued
to inhibit the levelling of rich and poor which education
was thought to accomplish. As a minister in Medford,
Massachusetts, stated:
I want to see the children of the rich and the
poor sit down side by side on equal terms as
members of one family.... [Tihe different
classes of the community will love and honor each
other, when they come to remembe these intimate
associations of their childhood. 10
Others expressed a similar notion but in less moralistic
terms:
The child is taught, from infancy, in a private
school, to look upon certain classes as inferior,
and born to fewer privileges. That is not
republican. This is not allowing al{1 1 as far as
possible, a fair start in the world.
The sense of equal opportunity to be provided by education
seems to have been clear by this time. Almost every group
involved in this debate articulated some version of this
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point.
Other issues went beyond a simplistic statement of the
capability of private schools to perpetuate class
stratification. A second point, found in the writings of
labor groups of the 1820's and 1830's, indicates awareness
of the adverse impact of the unequal distribution, not of
access to education, but of knowledge. The Working Man's
Party in Philadelphia in 1830 published a report that
criticized the curriculum in the public schools (which were
attended only by the poor) because it "extends, in no case,
further than a tolerable proficiency in reading, writing
and arithmetic, and sometimes to a slight acquaintance with
geography." 1 1 2 Their conclusions extended to a description
of the kind of education that should be offered, stating
that, "It appears, therefore, to the committees that there
can be no real liberty without a wide diffusion of real
intelligence....,,113 Concerns about the differential type
of education offered to different classes corresponds to
more recent conerns over such issues as tracking.
Two other issues regarding the effect of private
schools on the public institution were articulated by the
Working Men and the reformers: funding and quality of the
public schools. These two elements were seen to be
related. Perhaps implicitly acknowledging the private
benefits of an education, those involved in the struggle
recognized, that for public education to attract the
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affluent, the quality would have to be high. The labor
groups also saw that the stigma associated with public
schools was a result of their initial establishment for
paupers and their instructional method. Both of these facts
presented serious obstacles to achieving the quality
needed.
Much of the effort on this point was undertaken by
Robert Owen, a socialist reformer. His proposals involved
radical changes in the provision of education, including a
public boarding school system. However, he clearly
outlined the need to overcome the stigma of public
schooling:
...not schools of charity, but the schools of the
nation; to the support of which all contribute;
and instead of being almost a disgrace, it w d
become an honor to have been educated there.
Others argued as strongly for an improvement in the quality
of common schools:
The Common School is Common, not as inferior, not
as the schools for poor men's children, but as
the light and air are common. It ought to bglhe
best school because it is the first school.
Regardless of the specific argument used by different
factions, those who advocated free public education
presented a rather united position on the public benefits
of education and the need for public responsibility for its
provision. This is not to suggest that private benefits
were thought to be non-existent. A reasonable description
of the development of the present educational system could
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involve the story of a gradually shifting balance in favor
of private over public benefits of education. To a small
extent, as noted, some of this was evident during the
reform era. However, at the same time, the public benefits
of public education were an important basis of the
arguments of its advocates.
It cannot simply be concluded, however, that those
opposed to the public assumption of schooling did not value
these public benefits, and were opposed to public support
out of anti-egalitarian, undemocratic values. Such a
conclusion relies more on the ideas that have since
developed about public education than on the evidence. In
general, it appears that those opposed to public education
well recognized the importance of its public benefits, but
were not convinced of the appropriateness of public
responsibility for its provision. As Cremin points out:
[Miany of those opposed readily admitted, for
instance, that everyone in a republic ought to be
educated, but they steadfastly maintained that
only pau TEs should attend school at public
expense.
Like the proponents, opponents of public education
represented a wide range of viewpoints, some of which have
been forgotten as other issues came to dominate. For
example, one criticism of public education concerned the
type of government its establishment was seen to represent.
In 1880, Nathan Matthews, making a presentation in support
of private schools, accused public school advocates of
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proposing socialism.' 1 7 Later in the same argument,
Matthews expressed dissatisfaction with the Prussion-like
nature of public education and warned that it could lead to
tyranny. Although these concerns are not of critical
importance at present, a similar perspective ocassionally
emerges. 1 1 8 In 1980, Stanley Blumenfield described attempts
to establish public education as "the first step to be
taken toward a socialist society." 1 1 9 The effects of
opinions in this vein should not be overestimated. On the
other hand, the recurrence of similar views indicates they
do occupy at least a small portion of the minds of some
Americans.
Another reason for opposition to public schools was
based, in essence, on the public benefits of private
education. In the same way that some saw public education
as necessary in a democracy, others viewed private
education as fulfilling the same function--responding to
the promise of a democracy. The freedom to choose--in this
case, a mode of education--were thus synonymous with a free
society. Pluralism and religious freedom were critical
components of the democracy, and the ability to choose the
kind of education a person desires confirmed that these
components existed and functioned in the society.
Expansion of state-controlled education and the effort to
encourage withdrawal from private schools caused some to
fear that these components were eroding.
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The issue of whether education produced public or
private benefits does not seem to have distinguished the
two sides of the debate over the responsibility for
schooling. The question of the extent and character of the
public assumption of this responsiblity, however, certainly
did divide the viewpoints. Arthur Mead has attempted to
describe the positions of those opposed to public
education:
[S]ome were opposed because of added expense;
others were opposed because they desired to
patronize private schools and did not want to pay
taxes for public schools; still others, because
they did not want to pay taxes which would be
expended in another county (referring to state
taxes); and finally, a few believed that
secondary education co i9 not, and should not be
supported by taxation.
As noted, some individuals strongly believed that free
education should be provided only to the poor, not an
uncommon attitude in the history of American education.
Predictably, others simply felt the expenditures required
would be too great. Another perspective was that requiring
some monetary support from those benefitting individually
from the institution was the best way to ensure their
continued interest in education and in their children.
Charles Bulfinch expressed this view in 1817 in the debate
over whether to provide free primary schools in Boston.
Schultz summarizes his argument for private responsibility:
[H]e claimed that primary schools were
unnecessary because most parents who sent their
children to private tuition schools did not look
upon the expense as a burden; they paid the cost
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cheerfully out of love and a sens 2 f duty. This
in turn made them better parents.
The same thought recurs often in discussions over
educational policy. In 1858, a Michigan educator stated a
similar view, "If education costs nothing, it will be
estimated accordingly." 1 2 2
By far the strongest feelings arose over the issue of
whether general taxation for public education violated
property rights. In one analysis, two principles of a
democracy were seen to be in conflict: the right to own
property and the need for universal education. Although
the motivation of some was likely derived from a selfish
refusal to pay for the education of others, the argument
was also built on principles of justice and liberty. For
example, one proponent of this view argued:
Our present constitution recognizes this
principle by expressly providing that the
property of the individual cannot be taken from
him without his consent, except for public
purposes, and then only by giving an adequate
compensation. To allow the majority to say that
the minority shall part with their property in
the shape of taxes to defray the expense of the
education of others, who are able to bear such
expense is a palpable blow at this well
recognized principle, and is not the less odious
because being submitted to the people it 15ould
meet the approval of a majority of them.
The preservation of private property rights, in the
view of these opponents of universal public education,
outranked the public benefits generally agreed to be
associated with educated masses. The advocates of
education attempted to respond to this position by arguing
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that public education supported by taxation would produce
private benefits or, at least, public benefits in which
propertied individuals would share. As Thaddeus Stevens
explained:
It is for their own benefit, inasmuch as it
perpetuates the government and ensures the due
adminstration of the laws which they love, an 2 ywhich their lives and property are protected.
Egalitarian ideas were also presented in the debate.
To a few, the point was not so much that public support of
education should be limited to the poor, but that general
support of education by taxation would result in a large
number of individuals paying for the education of the
rich. In a sense, the existence of public education was
considered to be an income transfer from the less well off
to the wealthy. For that reason, public education should
be opposed. This idea was generally not precisely
articulated, but a sense of it was conveyed by the remarks
of a correspondent to a New York newspaper, "Justice frowns
upon compelling one man to pay towards the education of the
children of his rich neighbors." 1 2 5 Although studies of
this issue comment on this belief only occasionally, some
contemporary historians have introduced the interpretation
that public education--particularly, high school--was an
imposition on the majority by a more elite group. This
view is supported by the fact that only a very small
proportion of the school age population benefited from a
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high school education. 1 2 6
Substantial progress toward a resolution of the
conflict over the extent of public responsibility for
education occurred in the 19th century. With a general
recognition of its public benefits, the population accepted
the principle of supporting free public education for all
by general taxation. However, the tension surrounding the
issue has not disappeared, and it resurfaces particularly
as circumstances alter the way public and private benefits
are assigned to education. The consensus of support for
public schools has hardly been constant and, indeed, the
entire rationale for public education can be turned on its
head. For example, an 1895 address in support of academies
drew the following conclusion:
In the home or local system of schools, the aim
is really private education, and for ends more or
less personal, though it be obtained at public
expense. In the academical or collegiate system
of schools, the aim is a true public education,
though it may be obtained by means legally
private, that is, such as fujqished by
individuals or corporations.
In a debate where there is no agreement on which system
provides private benefits and which public, no consensus of
opinion can be expected. Rather, a tension between the
public and private sectors of education has sexisted
throughout the nation's history and continues today.
The traditional American faith in public education,
the history suggests, did not produce a unified consensus
of support for a particular model of public education.
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Rather, the evolution of the current public school system
involved any number of rather bitterly fought conflicts. A
related conclusion to be drawn from the historical analysis
is that the strong faith in public education resulted in
the assignment to the education institution of
responsibility for achieving many different public
benefits. However, the historical evidence also indicates
that recognition of private benefits contributed to some
aspect of that faith as well.
Thus, the historical analysis does not support the
idea that a competitive relationship between public and
private schools has always been characteristic of American
education. However, competitive elements of the provision
of schooling certainly cannot be dismissed as totally
absent from the historical record. The "pauper"
characteristics of public schools established a hierarchy
among types of education. In addition, many involved with
educational institutions recognized the potential
educational stratification between the rich and poor. The
ability of the public schools to reduce this stratification
by providing educational quality high enough to attract the
wealthy from more exclusive schools became the basis of
many debates.
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C. Current Manifestations
Faith in the power of education and the belief in
sharp distinctions between public and private schools
remain strong influences on how the problems of, and
solutions for, public education are constructed. The
notion that public education is distinguished by its public
control and funding and its non-sectarian character
establishes clear criteria by which to distinguish the two
institutions. However, even with the funding element, it
is not clear that the distinction is as sharp as the
definition promises.
Despite the heated controversy generated by proposals
to give public funds to private institutions, the evidence
shows that this transfer of money is relatively common.
Government data for 1970 recorded that 83% of the private
schools in the United States receive some sort of public
money. 1 2 8 Not every plan to channel public money to
private schools has won acceptance, but the statistics show
the amount of funding is not insignificant. The proponents
of support for private schools have, by and large,
convinced the public of the merits and appropriateness of
such expenditures. Even if individuals are aware of the
support, it is unlikely that the public acknowledges the
blurring of distinctions between public and private
education that it represents.
Another element of the belief in the distinction
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between public and private schools assumes that the one
inviolate principle of public education is that it is free
to all who attend. Americans have been particularly immune
to the evidence that this is not entirely the case. Yet,
in Massachusetts, after the implementation of Proposition 2
1/2, a tax-cutting measure adopted by referendum, almost a
third of the school districts instituted user fees for some
school services. 1 2 9 Despite the importance Americans
supposedly place on free education, little broad-based
criticism was heard. Trends of this nature are
particularly surprising in a state in which the law
carefully defines what a free public education means.
Other states, with less clear definitions, allow more
extensive fees to be charged to those attending public
schools. In Kansas, almost all school districts charge
fees for textbooks. 1 3 0 A study of a county in southwestern
Ohio found that the mean compulsory fees charged in 1978
amounted to $12.98 in kindergarten and $9.27 in sixth
grade. Seventy-eight percent of the school systems
reported that they charged first graders an average of
$6.53 for workbooks alone. Secondary students paid
compulsory fees in as many as 20 subject areas. Charges
for extracurricular activities were even more extensive.131
Similarly, a 1968 study found that academic expenditures
for Georgia high school students ranged from $62.75 to
$635.45, with an average cost of $192.25.132
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Nor are the charges necessarily for non-essential
education luxuries. A large number of states give
districts considerable discretion in determining whether to
supply free textbooks to all public school students. For
example, Kentucky law requires free textbooks for students
in grades 1 through 8. High school students, however, may
be required to purchase their texts, as well as
supplies.133 Other states require provision of free books
to indigent students only (a clear extension of the pauper
stigma).134
The impact of user fees for educational services is
difficult to measure. A report by the Children's Defense
Fund in 1974 cited the example of one Kentucky family
with an income of $2200 that faced textbooks fees of
approximately $50 for high school students. All of the
family's nine children had dropped out of high school for
financial reasons when they reached high school age. In
the same county, 21% of the children who were not attending
school cited inability to pay school fees as the cause of
their dropping out. 1 3 5 The report concluded that
educational fees act act as a substantial barrier to
school attendance, especially in areas where median income
is low, where poverty is common and where families are
large.
Similarly, public schools do not necessarily exhibit a
pure separation of church and state. Carl Kaestle
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summarizes the situation, "The idea of separation of church
and state with regard to education did not spring full-
blown from the United States Constitution. "13 6 The
definition of a non-sectarian education still remains an
item of intense controversey, eliciting extremely strong
opinions even from the President of the United States. The
forum for the debate has moved into the courts and, to
some extent, in textbook selection hearings. In addition,
communities in which such activities are widely approved
often allow a religious element in public education that
escapes the attention of those who would oppose it. A
recent suit in Virginia, for example, challenges the
constitutionality of Bible classes that have been held in a
public school system for 41 years and involve 98% of the
students in the district. 1 3 7
The faith in the power of education, although still a
strong belief, has undergone a rather substantial change.
Where this idea once emphasized the importance of public
benefits, the current focus depends on education to provide
private benefits, particularly economic ones. Surveys
indicate that parents feel the primary goal of education is
to ensure that their children will obtain the skills
necessary to get "good jobs" or to gain admission to "good"
schools (with the expectation of future economic
benefits). 1 3 8 Although the public economic benefits
produced by education are also viewed as important, this
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interest in pursuing private benefits with respect to
education seems to be an expanding component of education
discussions. "Schooling has become essential as a means of
access to occupations and learning itself is prized almost
exclusively for its economic benefits." 1 3 9
In order to understand the nature of the
public/private school relationship, the translation of
these ideas and their complicated history into action in
the form of social policies for education should be
examined. An evaluation of the assumption of a competitive
relationship between the two sectors requires an
investigation into the intentions, parameters and outcomes
of various policies established for both public and private
education.
III. Social Policy for Public Education
With some exceptions, a consensus of support for
public assumption of the responsibility for schooling was
established by the beginning of the 20th century. The
social policy that evolved from that consensus contains at
least two elements that are relevant to today's policy
questions: the concepts of parens patriae and
egalitarianism.
During colonial times, responsibility for children and
their education was assigned broadly to the community as a
60
whole, even though funding may not have come from community
sources. Marvin Lazerson comments:
[C]olonial communities (like some communitarian
groups today) were more inclined to think of
chidren as the responsibility of the whole
community. Churches, schools, and other community
institutions were active participants in rearing
children, and town fathers and other public
officials could enter homes to observe and
correct family life. They could warn parents,
publicly or privately, about too much or too
little punishment, about inattention to religious
instruction, unclean homes and ill-kept children.
In extreme cases, town fathers would place
children in other families who would exercise
parental responsibilities more diligently; in
Massachusetts, for example, the 1735 assembly
ordered children found "in gross ignorance"
placed in other families that would not neglect
their instruction. Children were frequently sent
by their own parents to live and work in other
families, another indication that childrearing40
was not solely the responsibility of parents.
This asumption of responsibility did not prevail, however:
By the mid-nineteeth century, the decline of
public responsibility and the enlargement of
private responsibility became rationalized by a
domestic ideology that declared the family
independent of other institutions and parents
superior to all other influences on children.
Ever since, childrearing has been presumed t T e
the responsibility of the "private" family."
Formulation of responsibility in this way operates as
a barrier to government involvement in the provision of
education: parents are clearly responsible, and their
actions, it is assumed, will be in the best interest of
the child. Within this framework, some other justification
for state intervention was necessary. A minister in New
Jersey, as early as 1838, provided a clear statement of the
rationale that would be devised:
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It is in vain to say that education is a private
matter, and that it is the duty of every parent
to provide for the instruction of his own
children. In theory it is so. But there are
some who can not, anI 4Phere are more who will
not, make provision.
Thus, the argument went, the state and the community, would
assume responsibility, through the provision of public
funds, for those children neglected by their parents. This
doctrine of parens patriae, rather than affirming broad
public responsibility for the welfare of children "has
taken on the negative cast of intervention only in
exceptional cases of parental failure."1 4 3
Most often, poverty was recognized as the primary
indicator that neglect was present. As a consequence,
expenditures of public funds for education were often
limited to the poor. In a similar vein contemporary social
policies for education, as well as in other social
welfare areas, are increasingly based on identification of
the "truly needy" - a clear manifestation that parens
patriae concepts continue in operation today.
Limiting the scope of public responsibility in this
way logically results in other notions that have important
consequences for education. Social policy designed within
the framework of parens patriae is a "response to the the
sense that the welfare of some members of society has
fallen to below a minimum level of decency." 1 4 4 The
policy, then, seeks to provide this minimum level of
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service, which is limited to those most at risk and aims
only to raise them up to a minimal level.
Social policies for public education have always fit
this description to some degree. Early charity schooling
required a declaration of pauperism and provided a clearly
inferior, but inexpensive, education to the poor. Even the
compensatory programs of the 1960's, although certainly not
inexpensive, implied the "condemnation of the poor." The
impact of social policy characterized by these views lies
in the evolution of a stigma attached to those receiving
public services. The stigma is much more visible in other
social welfare policies. For example, public housing
symbolizes the failure of parents to provide for their
families, and the nature of housing available generally
represents a minimum level of acceptability. "Public
housing thus partakes of the character of a last resort
rather than the character of modest decency." 1 4 5 The
stigma inherent in social policy for American education may
be less visible but is certainly no less powerful. Head
Start, vocational education and Title I are examples of
policies implemented in the public education institution
which, although designed to "help," attached a stigma to
those receiving the benefits.
The egalitarian aspect of social policy for education
evolved within the framework of parens patriae. In its
pure form, egalitarian ideology is incompatible with parens
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patriae and a minimalist objective. The intention to
reduce the degree of inequality in society cannot be
fulfilled if the remedy is applied only to those below the
policy minimum, and the strategy is to bring this group
only up to that minimum. In addition, a private
enterprise economy, with an unequal income distribution,
does not permit extensive radical public interference to
correct the disparity.
Yet social policy, even when dominated by parens
patriae and minimalism in its implementation, has often
been justified by egalitarian rhetoric. For example,
beginning early in the 20th century,state funding for
education commonly existed in the form of foundation
grants, given to each school district, regardless of need,
in order to bring their level of expenditures up to a
minimum level. David Cohen and Walter Haney point out that
even the name "foundation grant" implies the concept of
minimalism. However, the policy came under frequent attack
over the years because of its negative impact on improving
equality in expenditures among districts. This clearly
minimalist policy could not possibly help to remedy
inequality. Nonetheless, its detractors evaluated its
impact as if it were designed specifically to address the
equity issue. 1 4 6
Much of the uncertainty surrounding education policy
decisions evolves from the incompatibility of minimalist
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and egalitarian goals. Some critics regard this as the
fundamental contradiction in American education: "It
aspires to use public resources to enhance egalitarian
goals, but those in privileged positions are unwilling to
allow public responsibility to threaten their own--often
insecure--positions."147 One analysis of the resolution of
this incompatibility is that the egalitarian component of
educational policy does not allow any improvement in the
distribution of benefits. Rather, the effect of
"eqalitarian" programs is merely to shift the whole
distribution upward, preserving the same relative
positions. Historical evidence seems to support this
interpretation. As elementary education became widespread,
largely due to public support, the demand for high school
education increased. The same phenomenon occurred as a
high school diploma became commonplace: the increase in
college enrollment and stratification within higher
education (particularly with the community college) helped
to preserve the hierarchy.
Another response to the conflict in goals has been the
redefinition of "equality" as "equal opportunity," with
opportunity allocated according to merit. Such a sorting
mechanism, legitimized by faith in the power of testing,
allows a broader provision of public education and little
actual change in the degree of inequality. Further, the
promise of opportunity, with the only limitation being an
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individual's ability, preserves the private aspect of the
responsibility for education.
The private benefits education provides lead to
another dimension of social policy for public education.
The focus of educational policy on the private benefits of
education alters the nature of the public responsibility.
Thus, the private economy, the belief in meritocracy, and
the focus on the private, economic benefits of education
combine to define education as an item of competition. If
the private benefits are to be forthcoming, the quality of
the education offered must be adequate. When public
education is burdened by the doctrines of parens partiae
and minimalism, it will find it difficult to maintain this
quality. Consequently, the wealthy, implicitly attempting
to preserve their advantage, will seek out a higher level
of quality in private education, withdrawing support from
public education.
Concern over such a two-tiered system worried the 19th
century reformers. One response was to attack the elite,
undemocratic nature of private schools in the hopes of
attracting the wealthy and their support back to public
education. However, imploring the wealthy to recognize and
act on the public benefits of public education was not
often a sufficient incentive for them to sacrifice their
private benefits. Other policies were necessary to
encourage attendance by the upper classes in public
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schools. Early on, the importance of quality schools in
accomplishing this goal was clear, but the dilemma of how
to provide quality with inadequate resources seemed
serious.
One particular solution, devised in the 19th century,
has evolved into a critically important way of allowing
some to recruit the public institution to the purpose of
providing their private benefit. In Boston, in 1821, the
School Committee established a school, deliberately located
in an affluent neighborhood and specifically designed to
compete with private schools. A former Superintendent,
describing the school, stated th it was located in a
"territorial district...cut off from the rest of the city
[without] one poor dwelling in it." Thus, the school was
composed "wholly of pupils drawn from homes of culture,
wealth, luxury and refinement." 1 4 9 In assessing the
comments of the speakers at the school's opening, Lazerson
concluded, "It was, all the speakers agreeed, the city's
finest example of the strength of the public system and the
only means whereby the system could compete with the
private schools." 1 5 0
This sort of policy (and Boston was not unique in
developing such schools) can be seen as the precursor to
the policies that today facilitate residential sorting and
the ability of affluent districts to operate high quality
schools for their homogenous populations. The social
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policies, often in the form of tax regulations or funding
mechanisms, do not operate as explicitly as the programs of
compensatory education. Yet they have facilitated the
provision, within the public sector, of private benefits
equivalent to those available in the private sector,
Thomas Vitullo-Martin has examined tax policies within
this framework and found support for at least three
conclusions about the operation of tax regulations. 1 5 1
First, the federal tax system has evolved from a simple
device to raise revenue into a complicated mechanism to
encourage the behavior of taxpayers. From this
perspective, tax deductions function as government
subsidies for the purchase of deductable items, whether
they be restaurant meals, office furniture or education.
The "purchase" of education is subsidized by allowing the
deduction of state and local taxes (the cost of public
education) from the federal tax bill. Arguably, this
policy has a greater impact than any other on the
characteristics of the educational institution.
Second, the analysis shows that tax subsidies of this
kind offer significantly greater benefits for the affluent
than for the poor. Several factors contribute to this
result. A tax deduction system provides a greater amount
to wealthy individuals in higher tax brackets. In
addition, wealthy communities are able to spend high amount
per pupil with a reasonable property tax effort due to
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their superior tax base and lower public service expenses.
Adding a subsidy by means of tax deductions to this
situation serves to benefit residents of wealthy
communities to an even greater degree.
Vitullo-Martin's comparison of New York City to an
affluent Westchester County suburb, Pocantico Hills
illustrates the extent of the impact of these tax policies.
The expenditures and federal aid figures for each district
are as follows:
Expenditures Appropriations
New York City $3200 $300,000,000
Pocantico Hills $9500 10,000
Assuming a 50% tax bracket for Pocantico Hill and a
15% rate for New York City residents, the estimated tax
system for Pocantico Hills amounts to $6200 of the $9500
the town spends for each pupil.152 The New York City
benefit from this source comes to approximately $560 per
student. Various adjustments in the assumptions are
required since, for example, approximately 90% of New York
residents use the standard deduction and, therefore, would
not obtain any benefit from increased local taxes.
Vitullo-Martin concludes that:
Through the tax system, Pocantico Hills receives
eleven times the air per pupil that New York City
receives. Even counting all federal aid
together, we find that Pocantico Hills receives
more than six time% the aid per pupil than is
given to New York.
Yet the large difference in the amount of direct federal
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aid given to each community leads to the opposite
conclusion in assessing the focus of federal support for
the provision of education.
The third point supported by Vitullo-Martin's analysis
concerns the school-related outcomes of these tax policies.
He finds:
[Tihe most exclusive schools in America are
suburban public schools. Enrollment in them is
determined strictly by stringent economic
criteria, that is, by the family's having enough
capital tfp y a house in a high-income school
district.
In addition, tax policies that allow mortgage interest
deductions effectively subsidize wealthy homeowners' cost
of residence. Vitullo-Martin argues further that tuition
expenses of private schools are by no means as high a
requirement and that, unlike private schools, affluent
suburban districts do not offer scholarships to low-income
students living outside the district.
Thus, in assessing the effects of tax policy on
American education, the study draws the following
conclusion:
As policies now stand, we encourage in public and
private schools the opposite of what democratic
ideology holds should be the role of schools in a
democratic republic. There is no justifiable
basis for providing a free education to wealthy
families in economically and racially segregated
schools, but our taxation policy goes further and
offers a P5 ncentive to the wealthy to use these
schools.
The pursuit of private benefits, although not obvious in
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explicit education policies, thus dominates the implicit,
but not ineffective, policies that influence education.
The system of providing education should insure that
students have equal access to elements that contribute to
good quality. 1 5 6 Although many of these factors are
difficult to identify and arguably impossible to regulate,
equal access to public resources should be fundamental to
the system. However, the method of funding public
education fosters large disparities with suburban
communities able to offer high quality schools with a
relatively small tax effort. Reliance on property taxes to
support education produces a system whereby affluent
communities, with a small sacrifice, can spend a large
amount per pupil. For example, Lincoln, Massachusetts,
spends over $4,400 for each public school pupil (not very
different from private school tuition) with a tax rate of
only $17.00 per $1000 valuation, well below the average for
the Boston metropolitan area. Stoughton, in contrast,
manages to generate only $1774 per pupil, despite its
higher tax rate ($2 2.80).157
Even where the system of school funding is "reformed"
by adjusting state aid formulas to provide greater equality
in school spending, those benefiting from prior
inequalities often manage to preserve their advantage. For
example, Massachusetts' state aid system was revised in
1978, but a "hold-harmless" provision was included in the
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reform package, so that districts were guaranteed that
their aid would not be reduced. Today, 335 of 405
districts in the state continue to receive their state aid
under the old formula, persuant to this provision.1 58 The
inequality that prompted the reform thus still exists to a
large extent. The irony of the funding mechanism is that
public education is frequently argued to provide the public
good of eliminating the inequality produced by an unequal
distribution of income. The funding system, however, is
based on this inequality and thereby preserves the
inequality that the institution is supposed to rectify.
These elements of social policy for education operate
to various degrees at different times. The interplay among
them, however, generally results in differential outcomes
for the rich and the poor. The myth of the meritocracy is
that talent and ability will be the only sorting mechanisms
in American society. Arguably this is true for some
individuals. However, at a more aggregated level, clear
indications of differences in educational outcomes for rich
and poor students are evident. Much criticism along these
lines has been directed toward tracking systems by which
different versions of a "common" education are provided to
students ostensibly of different ability levels. The
extent to which affluence or social class correlates with
the assignment of students to different educational formats
obviously affects the degree to which the institution
72
transcends class stratification. Even within a single
building or school, class differences can be accentuated,
rather than overcome by public education.
Class differences among school districts are perhaps
even more striking. In homogeneous, affluent communities,
social policy for public education produces outcomes quite
different from that suggested by the underlying policy
themes applicable elsewhere. The provision of education
in towns of this type is not minimalist in character.
Rather, public schools in many rich communities rival
prestigious private institutions in their reputation for
quality. Further, the concept of parens patriae does not
apply; it would be difficult to argue that a population,
such as that of Weston, Massachusetts, with a median income
in excess of $50,000 living in homes with a median value of
$150,000 are ever "at risk."1 5 9 Consequently, apart from
any hierarchy that exists within the town, no stigma is
attached to those attending the public school.
Residents of affluent communities have obviously
learned to use the public institution for their own gain--
to achieve a high quality education for their children at
public expense. As in the past, members of the community
benefit from the existence of a good educational system.
The benefits thereby produced do not include the
maintenance of social control and tranquility, public
benefits which would probably be present even without
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schools. Rather, the benefits of such schools are
principally private in nature. Indeed, necause a good
school system may be critical in preserving property values
for community residents, it is in the private interest of
everyone in the community to support a quality public
educational system, whether they participate in it or not.
Since the funding system allows this to occur with a small
tax sacrifice, the residents receive a variety of benefits
for little effort. The cumulative outcomes of these
policies represent a significant transfer of benefits from
the poor to the rich.
Thus, the nature of the operative educational policy
in suburban communities departs from the principles that
guided its evolution. These principles, however, are very
much in evidence when examining the outcomes of educational
policies for the poor. The inability of the poor to use
public institutions for their private gain results in
educational outcomes that are minimalist and burdened by
notions of parens patriae. In school systems populated by
the poor, the quality of education is typically low
(ignoring the problem of measuring quality and using,
instead, the criteria "would the middle class be willing to
enroll its children in such schools?"). Many would argue
that the poor do receive a substantial portion of public
money. However, whether the allocation to the poor is
substantial relative to expenditures in other areas, these
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funds are intended to serve the public good under the
doctrine of parens patriae, not produce private gain for
the poor. In this way, the use of public policy has very
different results for the rich and poor: the rich may use
the system for individual aggrandizement; the poor cannot.
The explicitness of policies for the poor make them
susceptible to criticism. Direct, visible allocations
symbolize "handouts" to much of the American public. As a
result, the "effectiveness" of making such allocations
undergo "scientific" evaluation, and various types of
stigma are associated with receiving the benefits. On the
other hand, the policies for the rich are not visible, but
are tucked away in tax laws and real estate purchases.
Little evaluation of the costs, benefits or effectiveness
of these policies occurs, and there is certainly no stigma
attached to deducting mortgage interest from taxable
income.
Occassionally concern develops for a more equitable
approach to educational policy. Two particular issueshave
dominated the past 20 years: equality of access to schools
and equity in school finance. Within the framework
described above, neither one will be completely realized.
As Cohen has explained, the pursuit of equality often
means raising the minimum level provided, but usually
implies also that the maximum will go up correspondingly.
Pure equality is not achieved until the minimum equals the
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maximum. Thus, while minimum educational attainment has
gone up dramatically during the 20th century, the expansion
of higher education has allowed relative positions to be
preserved. School finance reform has also suffered from
the inequity inherent in the basic policy. For example,
after eight years of attempting to reduce funding
inequalities, pursuant to court order, in the state of New
Jersey, the situation is more unequal today than it was
when the effort began.160 Proposals that attempt to limit
the maximum permissible expenditure on public schools, and
to redistribute the funds thereby made available to make
the minimum and the maximum closer, have been soundly
defeated. Policies of this type violate the principle that
education is essentially a private responsibility. American
unwillingness to pay for the education of the children of
others remains strong, as long as the interest in obtaining
private benefits increases:
Equality of opportunity has fallen before the
pressure of parents seeking advancement for their
own children. At the same time that we look to
the schools for collective solutions to social
and economic problems, individual parents work to
make sure 1 e schools serve primarily their own
children.
Social policy for public education, therefore,
reflects contradictions, compromises, and differential
outcomes stratified by class. Apart from isolated attempts
to improve school effectiveness, no coherent policy or even
proposals exist to address these problems. Americans seem
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satisfied that the system is properly framed. However,
they are not satisfied with the quality of that system.
Even in affluent districts, with high quality schools,
concern over the quality of education is substantial.
Having likely obtained the maximum benefit from the public
system as it exists, the citizens in such communities
switch their focus to private education. Within the
framework that "private is better," parents view the
private benefits of a private education to be more
desirable that those they receive from the public
institution. When this occurs, the use of public means to
gain a private school education becomes an element of
educational policy.
IV. Social P for Private Education
Other than the direct public subsidy of private
education that existed when the distinctions between public
and private schooling were not so strict,implicit or
explicit policies for private education date from the
establishment of the modern version of public education in
the 19th century. The adverse effects of private
enrollment on the ability of public schools to provide a
common education experience were well understood at this
time, so that policies aimed at public schools served
indirectly as policies for private schools.
Occasionally, concern over attendance in non-public schools
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was the explicit motivation for education policy. However,
even when the private sector was the focus of the policy,
remedies were implemented primarily in the public school
system. Creating exemplary schools to attract the affluent
to the public schools and even the establishment of general
taxatibn to support public education were examples of
policies designed to affect private institutions, despite
their deployment in the public sector only. As the two
educational systems evolved, direct public policy
involvement in private schools was generally avoided.
The contemporary version of the issue of the
appropriate relationship between public and private
educational systems centers on the question of funding.
The role of public funds in supporting private schools has
been a major education issue for at least 30 years. During
this time, however, the parameters of the funding issue
have changed dramatically. In the late 1960's, for
example, there was a strong sense that private schools were
on the brink of financial collapse. The cost of education
was increasing markedly, and many private (particularly
Catholic) schools were closing, because of these increasing
costs and declining enrollments. Public educators feared
the serious impact on public schools if they were forced to
absorb a large number of private school pupils.
As late as 1964, the possibility of a widespread
collapse of the private schools seemed remote. The post-
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war peak for private high school enrollment occurred in
1965 and, in that previous year, elementary and overall
private enrollment recorded the second highest figures of
the period since 1948.162 The first federal policy
prescription to provide funding to private schools was
included in the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education
Act. Incorporating a child-benefit concept in order to
avoid constitutional obstacles, the Act funneled public
money to children attending private schools. Ironically,
this infusion of federal funds into private schools was
followed by precipitous declines in private school
enrollments. By 1970, the figure had dropped to 10.5%,
down about one-third in just five years. 1 6 3 Moreover,
despite federal funding, the financial position of private
schools began to erode. The ability of private schools to
fund their operation became an issue of top priority. The
implicit remedy to the problem framed this way was clear:
allocate additional public money to private schools.
The rationales for such a solution drew on traditions
from as far back as the colonial era. Private schools were
said to represent an important public good because they
allowed the pluralism and free choice that were essential
to a democracy. John F. Gardner's essay, "Towards a Truly
Public Education," written in support of aid to private
schools, stated:
A truly public education would support the right
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of every individual child to a good education--as
judged by his parents, and perhaps a fair panel
of educators. It would establish and finance not
schools,11bt the parental right of choice among
schools.
By 1972, the Report of the President's Panel on Non-
public schools concluded that only two courses of action
were reasonable even to consider: (1) stand by passively
while non-public schools decline and accept the inevitable
consequences of further increased taxes occasioned by the
transfer of students from private to public schools; or (2)
act on the premise that wise public policy requires
intervention at critical points to sustain a system which
educates over 5 million youngsters, involves a multi-
billion dollar private investment, and provides for
parental choices. 1 6 5
The only aspect of the relationship between public and
private schools considered in the 1972 Report was the cost
of increased public school enrollments that would be
caused by the closing of private schools. However, this
problem definition and its implicit remedy were more
directly focussed on the private sector than in any
previous era. In retrospect, the absence of any discussion
of the relative quality of public and private education
seems suprising. In just five more years, that issue would
become the overriding concern of the public and the policy
makers. In 1972, however, even though some of the
remedies being proposed--vouchers and tax credits, for
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example--were similar to those advanced today, the problem
being addressed was the decline of private schools.
By 1977, the problem had switched to the decline of
public schools. The focus of the debate still centered
on the funding issue but within the context of "failing"
public institutions. Critics, from both ends of the
political spectrum, advocated policies that would use
public funds to facilitate enrollment in private schools.
The present formulation of the conservative argument
in support of a pure voucher system was first articulated
by Milton Friedman. His basic position is that the
government should finance, but not manage, education. The
public benefit of a minimum level of schooling makes
government funding reasonable; however, educational
services should be supplied by private enterprise. A
voucher system would allow parents to express their
preferences for various kinds of education. This philosophy
stresses the importance of the private benefits of
education and views a virtually unregulated marketplace as
the best way to distribute them. 1 6 6
More liberal critics in the early 1970's also proposed
voucher-type systems, but with an entirely different
rationale. In their view, the element missing from the
existing public system was not necessarily quality, nor
market competition, but choice. A voucher system can
therefore be an appropriate remedy to allow choice of the
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type of education a person desires. The greatest
departure from the Friedman model was in the regulation of
the voucher marketplace. Where the conservatives supported
an "invisible hand" approach, the system proposed by the
liberals incorporated complicated mechanisms designed to
assure equitable outcomes. Selection of applicants by
lottery, quotas for low income and minority students, and a
sliding scale of voucher value were proposed to ensure that
the system would not increase inequality. 1 6 7
Another reform effort also seized upon the voucher
idea as the solution to a third problem. Part of the
school finance reform movement emphasized "taxpayer
equity," the idea that equal effort by taxpayers should
generate the same amount of revenue for schools. Some
proponents of this idea have devised a reform of the public
school system that emphasizes family choice. The thrust of
this reform is to extend the ability to "escape" public
schools to a larger segment of the population by allowing
them to spend the public money allocated to each
child'seducation at a private school more suited to his or
her needs. In order to participate, private schools would
have to agree to follow certain regulations set down by a
publicly controlled board. In essence, this plan would
create a new system of schools which, in the designers'
view, would result in a more "public" system than that
which presently exists. 1 6 8
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None of these ideas has achieved a significant level
of legislative success. The family choice plan was
defeated in California referenda in 1979 and 1982. An
early 1970's voucher experiment in Alum Rock, California,
produced mixed results and did not lead to any more
demonstrations. Instead, interest seems to have shifted to
a related policy proposal--tuition tax credits.169
one analysis has concluded that vouchers represent too
radical a change for Americans and, thus, are unlikely ever
to win broad-based approval. An alternative perspective is
that the change from voucher to tuition tax credit
proposals parallels the increasing strength of the belief
that private education is superior and that the private
benefits of education are paramount. Voucher proposals, in
contrast, reflect some degree of interest in preserving
the public benefits of education. Also, the belief that
the resulting system would be more public was strong, even
in the family choice plan. Neither version incorporated
the idea that the public sector should be declared a
failure and that public funds would be better spent in
private education.
Tuition tax credits rank high with the present
administration, as an appropriate federal education
policy. This policy, however, is not an invention of
President Reagan. In 1978, the House approved a version of
the policy (the Senate defeated the bill, but 41 Senators
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voted approval). The 1980 Republican platform endorsed
tuition tax credits as "a matter of fairness, especially
for low-income families..." Despite the failure of the
97th Congress to pass a tax credit bill, the proposal
continues to reappear and still commands administration
support. 17 0
In addition to representing a shift in policy emphasis
from public to private schools, tuition tax credits reflect
support for the assumption that the public-private
relationship is based on competition and that this
competition will produce higher quality public education.
The idea of competition appears in proposals for merit pay,
magnet schools, and differential pay for teachers of
certain disciplines, and clearly provides the foundation
for tuition tax credits. Reliance on competition is a
component of the complex idea of the free market, and the
effectiveness of competition in improving quality holds
widespread support. Many Americans would agree with
President Reagan who summarizes the idea, "I have remarked
before that without a race there can be no champion;
without competition to excel in our educational system we
will not have excellence."1 7  The present climate, with
its emphasis on private benefits, is very receptive to
policies incorporating competition as a solution.
V. Research and Policy
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The increased reliance on the device of
competition between public and private schools as a basis
of remedial policies for public education presents a
challenge to the research community. Substantial research
is required to provide adequate information to support an
explicit social policy for private education, since the
private sector has not been studied to a great extent.
While few large-scale inquiries into private schools
have ever been undertaken, the general interest in private
education has generated a number of such efforts in recent
years. Most of these studies seem to focus on one or
more of three major questions. First, a substantial
portion of the research has been devoted to comparing the
educational outcomes of public and private schools.
Primarily using standardized test scores and statistical
methods to control for variations in student
characteristics, researchers have amassed data attempting
to determine which sector produces higher achievement. For
example, one of the most recent studies, High School
Achievement, by James Coleman and others has this form. A
related element of this inquiry attempts to identify what
characteristics of the school experience relate to high
achievement, at least by noting what is common about the
schooling that high achieving students receive.1 7 2
A second major element of current research tries to
85
determine what reasons underly the decisions to enroll in
private schools. An alternative formulation of this
question seeks to identify the characteristics of
indiviudals who choose private education.173 Finally, a
third component seeks to analyze the effects of various
policy proposals on existing enrollment patterns. Such
research seeks to evaluate such assertions as that only the
rich would benefit from tution tax credits or, alternately,
that the poor would enroll in private education at a higher
rate. Although the assumptions necessary to draw
conclusions of this type are large, some studies are
involved in attempting to provide estimates of what the
patterns would be. 1 7 4
The focus of current research on these three areas
reflects the formulation of the issue as a competition
between public and private schools. In this context,
questions such as determining which sector offers better
quality education are reasonable to pursue. However,
research directed in these ways is not useful to address
the issue of whether the assumption of a competitive
relationship is warranted. In addition, the conclusions
supported by research framed in this way are vulnerable to
criticism that is likely to weaken their ability to inform
the policy debate.
One problem is the difficulty of measuring the quality
of an education. No satisfactory consensus has ever
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developed around a legitimate way to measure quality. One
opinion is that output measures, such as standardized test
scores or the percent of graduates attending college, are a
reasonable approximation of school quality. An opposing
opinion is that easier-to-standardize input measures, such
as per-pupil expenditures are a better surrogate.
Regardless of which proxy measure is used, the conclusions
of the study will be subject to dispute.
Moreover, no current measure of school effectiveness
can determine the value-added component of educational
output. Thus, for example, if a school system manages to
graduate affluent students with reasonable test scores and
admissions to selective colleges, the school may well be
judged very effective, using output measures. Certainly it
would be rated more effective than a school that helps
disadvantaged individuals to score slightly below average
on standardized tests, and sends many of them directly into
the work force. Yet, the extent to which the latter school
has added to its students' ability to perform may be
greater. Some legitimate way to consider and compare the
value-added benefits of schooling would therefore be
illuminating. However, in the absence of such a method,
studies that rely substantially on quality measures are
likely to be subject to criticism. Research attempting to
determine the quality difference between public and private
schools, thus, is particularly vulnerable to the
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measurement of quality problem.
Second, the assumption that public and private
educational sectors can be considered and understood in the
aggregate does not account for the substantial differences
that exist in each sector. For example, a belief that
"private schools are better" implicitly equates the
education offered at fundamentalist Christian private
schools with that provided by Catholic schools and the
prestigious, non-denominational boarding schools. Clearly,
one would be unlikely to express the idea that a Catholic
and a fundamentalist private education are substantially
the same. Nevertheless, most research into private
education proceeds as if private schools were a singular
institution. Distinctions relating to region, to cost
differences, to populations served and to type and
characteristics of schools are generally minimized.
Nor do researchers often differentiate among public
school systems. Although the distinctions within the
public sector are of a different nature, they receive
treatment similar to the differences within the private
sector. Wealthy suburban school systems offer a strikingly
different education from that of struggling, inner-city
schools. However, both are grouped under the general
rubric, "public education."
This reservation extends to the other research
questions noted above as well. For example, the reasons
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for choosing to enroll in a private school are complex and
certainly very different for different categories of
private schools. The reasons an inner-city parent opts to
enroll his non-Catholic child in a Catholic school likely
differ radically from the reasons that a fifth generation
graduate of a prestigious boarding school elects to send
his son to hisalma mater. Yet the design of many research
studies treats these two decisions as equivalent.
One result of these problems is that the evaluation of
current research is often reduced to a methodological
debate. Criticism of the Coleman report, for example, has
focussed principally on the assumptions and methods used in
the statistical analysis. For example, the appropriateness
of comparing the performance of private school students,
virtually all of whom are preparing for college, with that
of a sample drawn from the full range of students attending
public schools has been questioned. One critic has argued
that, if only college-bound students within public schools
were compared with private school students, any achievement
differences noted by Coleman would disappear.175 Whether
this conclusion is any more useful than Coleman's in the
current policy debate remains a question.
Thus, the current research framework is not
appropriate to address the question of whether the
relationship between public and private schools is
competitive. In the absence of relevant research
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findings, policy discussions and the opinions of the
general public often are based on assumptions about
relationship between the two institutions. One pervasive
belief is the sense that the low quality of public
education causes parents to choose private schools for
their children. If this is true, communities with inferior
schools should have a correspondingly high proportion of
students attending private institutions. To some extent,
this idea provides the foundation for much of the
discussion about the problems of, and remedies for, public
education today. Another belief is that enhancing the
ability of parents to select private schools over public,
by providing financial subsidy of some kind, will establish
a competitive situation whereby the public schools will
have to improve their quality in order to survive. The
logical extension of this idea is that the quality of the
public schools will eventually improve. However, it is not
clear whether this means that communities with high quality
public schools should show a high or a low percentage
attending private schools.
Other theories operate in this arena as well. For
example, one belief is that, since private schools are
exclusive and require above average income to attend,
"rich" communities will send a large proportion of students
to private schools. The quality of the public school is
not an important causal factor in this view. Another
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belief is that communities that have a high proportion of
students attending private schools are likely to spend a
low amount on public education because of the desire to
avoid "double" payment for education. The inconsistencies
and contradictions inherent in these beliefs do not prevent
their concurrent use.
In a sense, each view represents a separate stage in
a complicted swirl of events in the relationship between
public and private schools. For example, those who expect
communities with a high private enrollment to have small
expenditures on public education concentrate on a
different portion of the scenario than those who assert
that competition improves public school quality. In
addition, both perspectives tend to ignore the cause and
effect relationship. It is not clear whether a high
private school enrollment causes a loss of financial
support for public schools and, thus, leaves the public
institution with inadequate resources to offer a reasonable
education or if an inferior public education drives people
to seek private alternatives. Whether the "abandonment" or
the "improved quality" model serves as the basis, most most
theories assume the existence of a competitive relationship
between public and privte education. Currently, these
beliefs have become prominent in devising remedies for the
"problem" of education.
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VI. Empirical Analysis
The current belief in the competitive relationship
between public and private education would lead one to
assume that private school enrollment is increasing. Many
believe that widespread dissatisfaction with public
education has resulted in desertion to private education
throughout the nation. In today's climate, it is difficult
for an individual to believe that the trend could ever
operate in the opposite direction--from private to public
education. Thus, the seemingly logical conclusion is that
the proportion of private school enrollment must be
increasing. The figures, however, fo not confirm this
belief.
In 1948, private schools enrolled 9.5% of the nation's
students; in 1979, the figure was 9.8% During this 30-year
span, the proportion ranged from a low of 9.3% to a high of
14.7%.176 Data from 1889 record 9.3% attending "private"
schools. 1 7 7 Clearly the variation over 90 years has not
been extraordinary. Generally, private education involves
about 10% of the nation's students.
In the last two years, private enrollment has
increased by 1.1%. This change certainly does not justify
sweeping declarations of mass desertion from the public
sector. Further, 1982-83 figures show a 2.2% drop in
Catholic school enrollment. 1 7 8 Private school enrollment in
1981 (10.8%) was, in fact, lower than it was in 1965
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(14.3%).179 The irony in these figures resides in the
realization that the percentage was at its highest when
expenditures and faith in public education were relatively
high. Today, when the situation is one of retrenchment in
both funding and confidence, a smaller proportion opts for
private education. However, this type of information does
not prohibit even well-regarded studies from assuming great
increases in private enrollment.
Despite the rather stable percentage of students who
enroll in private education, many insist on studying the
fluctuations in enrollment that appear. Interpreting
enrollment trends and attempting to find causal
explanations occupies a great deal of research effort.
Studies find it legitimate to search for the meaning behind
the increase from 9.8% to 10.9% between 1979 and 1981. By
employing different methods or perspectives, quite
different conclusions can be supported by the same numbers.
For example, in assessing Dennis Doyle's conclusion that
the enrollment patterns provide evidence of dissatisfaction
with public education. Laura Salagnik takes the same data
and concludes that "from the viewpoint of total enrollment
since 1900, the public sector is not atypically weak
now." 1 8 0 Looking at figures showing a fall-off in Catholic
school enrollment, Salagnik questions arguments that
explain this drop as due to school closings. In her view,
an equally reasonable conclusion is that the decline is due
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to changing preferences for types of schooling. Attempting
to find causal relationships to explain fluctuations in the
trend does not illuminate the issue significantly,
particularly when, in the last century, private school
enrollment has never exceeded 15%.181
On the other hand, the stability of over-all public
school enrollment in the last decade masks the shift in the
distribution of private school pupils. Catholic schools in
the Northeast saw their enrollment drop by 44% during this
period. This decline was balanced by a sharp increase in
the number of students enrolling in fundamental schools in
the Southwest. 1 8 2 The aggregate analysis does not show
these, perhaps important, changes. In addition, average
figures downplay the occurrence of relatively high private
school enrollments in certain communities. For example, in
1970, the cities of Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cleveland and
Albany all sent more than 30% of their students to private
schools. 1 8 3 The question of why non-public enrollment is
so high in these communities is a reasonable one to pursue,
particularly when seemingly comparable cities record very
different attendance rates. An inquiry into community-
specific differences, therefore, makes much more sense than
trying to explain national trends that gloss over localized
differences.
One significant departure in research design might
results that are more readily useful in evaluating the
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existence of a competitive relationship between public and
private schools. Rather than focussing on the individual,
research should define the community as the appropriate
unit of analysis. Decisions to attend private schools
typically weigh two possibilities: should the student
enroll in the public school provided by the community in
which he or she lives, or should the student select a
reasonable private school alternative? The assessment of
the public schools in the community, therefore, arguably
plays an important role in the decision process. Apart
from any assumptions about the effects of competition on
either institution, what exists at the community level is
likely to be critical to the decision.
Traditionally, the community is the unit that
determines the character of the available public education.
The perceived quality of public education systems is most
often assigned on a community basis rather than school by
school. The public recognizes, in a general way, whether
or not a town has "good" schools. Thus, the pattern of
enrollment in each particular community would be a very
useful phenomenon to examine.
Several questions that might prove relevant could be
examined in such a community-based reserach design: What
type of communities are characterized by a high enrollment
in private schools? What measurable relationship exists
between private school participation and public school
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support within a community? Such a focus legitimately
ignores the quality issue as it is usually framed and thus
avoids the associated measurement problems. Similarly,
individual achievement does not prove useful in examining
these questions. Achievement aggregated across one
community might produce some useful information, however.
For example, what kinds of communities are associated with
high achievement?
The important difference in this approach is that the
analysis concentrates on community characteristics. The
state traditionally delegates the responsibility for
providing education to the cities and towns. Thus, it is
legitimate to assume some degree of homogeneity within
public education in a given community. It is not
reasonable to assume sufficient homogeneity within any
larger division. Certainly state level analysis will not
yield interpretable results. Expansion of the inquiry to
the entire public or private sector appears to make little
sense. Yet the majority of research has exactly that level
of aggregation.
A second reason for concentrating on the community level
is that a general increase in the national proportion of
students attending private schools will have only a small
statistical impact on the average community. Thus, if
private school enrollment increased by 500,000 students,
and that increase were distributed evenly among the 50
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states, the average state public education system, without
weighting for population, would lose 10,000 students. In
Massachusetts, if those students were drawn equally from
the 351 cities and towns, each district would transfer 30
students to private schools. The aggregate proportion of
private school enrollment would change from 10.9% to 12.1%,
but the local community would likely not notice the impact.
However, if those 10,000 students were withdrwing
disproportionately from some districts, the effect could be
a more serious concern. Thus, the variation of public and
private school participation among communities becomes
important to determine which communities have a strong
tradition of private school enrollment and are, therefore,
likely to see a loss of support for their public schools.
The public schools in a town with a current 2% enrollment
in private schools will not suffer a great effect even if
its private school pupils doubled to 4%. On the other
hand, a community in which 30% attend private schools will
experience a dramatic change if such a doubling occurred
there. Knowing when private enrollment is high can help to
predict the impact of policy proposals and allow informed
speculation on what the causal link might be.
Determining what relationships actually exist in
communities can help in assessing the appropriateness of
the common assumption of competition. To this end, a study
of the patterns of public and private school participation
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in 91 Massachusetts communities examined two questions: (1)
What are the characteristics of communities that provide
good or high quality public education? and (2) what kinds
of communities enroll a high proportion of students in
private education? The intent of the analysis was to
compare the two sets of characteristics to provide
information about the relationship between public and
private schools in communities.
One strategy of the study was to investigate
whether competitive interaction between the two sectors
(resulting in abandonment or improved quality, for example)
is supported by the data. For example, the results should
be able to address the question of whether offering a high
quality public education has any relationship to the
percentage of students enrolling in private school.
Conversely, the same data should show whether a high
private school enrollment influences the quality of the
public schools.
A second strategy of the analysis was to identify what
kinds of communities do offer a high quality public
education. Although some argue that the quality of the
public education system in a given community is a matter of
community preference, other factors may prove to be more
important. Further, these characteristics can be compared
to the characteristics of those towns enrolling a large
proportion of students in private education. This kind of
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information can help to clarify the relationship between
the two sectors further and to evaluate the impact of
policy proposals on particular communities.
Each of the basic questions addressed in the study
presented problems in the selection of measures. As noted,
no satisfctory measure of educational quality has yet been
devised. Still, some choice among the available proxies
had to be made. This is a major obstacle in any study of
this type, since, as Robert Reischauer comments:
Although most public concern has correctly
focussed on the disparities in the quality of
education children receive, it has proven
difficult if not impossible to measure and
compare the quality 95 schooling provided by
different districts.
In addition:
[Tihe problem is compounded by the difficulty
of separating the effect of the schools from
the influences of native ability, home
environment, peer group pressures and other
factors that seem to affect achievement, but
over whif 5the school system has little
control.
Even the Coleman report received substantial criticism on
this point.
Although the experts have devoted substantial effort
to the problem of a legitimate quality measure, the public,
it can be argued, has no similar problem recognizing "good"
and "bad" schools. Without any scientific data, most
people likely have strong opionions about whether the
school system in their own community is "good," and
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probably whether the schools in surrounding towns are "as
good" Further, the differences among individual
perceptions might well not be very large.
Thus, rather than attempting to solve the problem of
measuring school quality, the study used two admittedly
imperfect proxies: expenditures per pupil and the
percentage of graduates enrolling in four-year private
colleges. These two measures represent an input and an
output characteristic, each of which matches reasonably
well with the ideas of the experts and those of the public,
as to what is needed for, and constitutes, "good"
education.
Expenditures per pupil, despite its many problems,
commonly serves to represent educational quality. Although
the effect of an additional $100 expenditure per pupil on
the quality of education that a student receives is
certainly questionable, few school systems spending in the
top 10% would be considered to have poor quality schools.
Nor would any of the systems ranking in the bottom 10% be
judged to have good schools by any measure of quality. In
addition, because the goal of this analysis is to evaluate
the principles underlying the current policy discussions,
per pupil expenditures must be considered, since the
spending decisions in a community may be important in
defining the relationship between public and private
schools.
100
The rationale for using the percentage of graduates
enrolling in private colleges is that this variable
corresponds closely to the opinions about school quality
held by the public, despite its likely correlation with
such factors as income and social class (or perhaps because
of it). Since the public can assign a general label of
quality to school systems, some factors must be producing
that general sense. High average test scores do not have
the broad-based impact on the public necessary to influence
opinion. To the extent that private colleges are
considered to be more selective and academically
prestigious (perhaps this is true only in New England), a
high percentage of graduates attending such schools may
well convince people that the school and, therefore, the
community provide a good quality education. hus, while the
objections to these two measures cannot be disputed, they
are, nevertheless, appropriate to this analysis,
particularly since its intention is to evaluate existing
beliefs, rather than to formulate new principles.
The second area of analysis--determining the
characteristics of communities that enroll a large
proportion in private schools--is not as problematic. The
major issue arises from using the total number of students
attending all private schools, rather than using figures
for different categories of private schools. As noted
previously, dividing enrollment figures among categories of
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private schools often results in small sample sizes and
uninterpretable results. In this study, however, the
important item of investigation is the relationship between
the two institutions, not enrollment patterns in various
types of private schools. Thus, the dependent variable in
this case, percent enrolled in private schools, matches the
goal of the analysis.
The study employed ordinary least squares regression
analysis to develop models to determine which of a number
of independent variables affect the dependent variables of
percentage of private school enrollment, percentage of
graduates attending private colleges and expenditures per
pupil in each community. Several categories of independent
variables were considered a priori. The general hypothesis
was that wealth, revenue and demographic factors influence
the nature of the public education in a community and its
relationship to the private sector. Population variables,
based on the 1980 U.S. Census of the Population, included
the dependency ratio (relating the total school age
population to the total population) and the percentge of
the population that belongs to a minority group.
1980 Census Data also provided several measures of
community wealth. The median value of owner occupied
housing and the median family income were used to decribe
the affluence of a community. Another wealth variable,
derived from the mean per capita income, was the amount of
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income available per pupil in a given community.186 This
variable arguably measures the resources available to send
an individual student to a private school and, therefore,
might influence the proportion of students enrolled in
private education.
The revenue category incorporated 1982 fiscal data on
equalized tax rates and equalized assessed valuation
collected by the Massachusetts Department of Revenue.
Equalized assessed valuation, converted to a per pupil
measure, and the equalized tax rate, were combined to form
a measure of the total tax levy available per pupil.
Somewhat analagous to the income per pupil variable, the
tax revenue each community has to spend on each pupil gives
an indication of the fiscal resources that public education
might use. 1 8 7
School factors, used s both independent and dependent
variables, included the per pupil expenditure, the
percentage of graduates attending private colleges and the
proportion of students enrolled in private schools.
Massachusetts' Department of Education data for the 1982-83
school year provided information on the expenditure and
private school variables, while the figures for attendance
at private colleges come from data on 1981 graduates. 1 8 8
The sample included 91 communities selected from the
351 municipalities in Massachusetts. Originally, all
municipal units comprising the Boston SMSA were included.
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The Boston SMSA was chosen because a substantial number of
private schools operate within this geographical area. In
other sections of the state, in contrast, the availability
of private schools varies a great deal. In addition, the
variation among Massachusetts communities in the variables
chosen precluded using all communities in the sample. The
degree of homogeneity among the towns of the Boston SMSA
with regard to educational characteristics relevant to this
study thus made it the most suitable choice.
One adjustment was made to the sample. The city of
Boston was excluded because it represents, in terms of the
variables selected, a very atypical community. Boston
faces radically different educational issues than do the
other cities and towns in the SMSA. The political, social
and economic factors influencing this public system are not
to be found anywhere else to that degree. Therefore, any
results of a study which included Boston would have to be
qualified with a separate explanation for the city.
The following table lists descriptive information on
the towns in the sample computed from the variables used in
the analysis:
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Standard
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
percent private
enrollment
per pupil
expenditure
percent private
enrollment
median family
income
median house
price
tax rate
equalized valuation
per pupil
dependency ratio
percent minority
levy per pupil
income per pupil
10.417
2620.066
27.681
5.896
506.834
12.250
27058.286 6206.090
66109.80
26.511
143.802
21.162
2.389
3649.931
470.188
21192.174
7.941
56.379
3.860
2.312
1227.694
155.078
1.493
1774
0
14481
35600
15.649
22.677
10.550
.386
1534.617
253.697
31.708
4407
64
51339
143600
68.960
326.674
28.085
17.689
9358.607
1101.633
The following general model was fit to determin the
effects of the independent variables on expenditures per
pupil:
Y = B0 +B1 (Q)+B 2 (R)+B 3 (S)+B 4 (T)+B 5 (U)+B 6 (V)+B 7 (W)+B 8 (X)
where Y = expenditures per pupil ($)
Q = median family income ($)
R = income per pupil ($)
S = median house price ($)
T = levy per pupil ($)
U = dependency ratio
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V = percent minority population
W = percent attending private colleges
X = percent attending private elementary
and high schools
The best model developed from this analysis included the
variables levy per pupil, median family income and the
dependecy ratio. All coefficients were significant at .01
and the R2 was .823 The results were as follows:
Per pupil expenditure = 1517.224 + 0.167(levy per
pupil) +.055(median family income)
-49.331(dependency ratio)
This model shows a that higher dependency ratio result
in a lower per pupil expenditure. If the community has a
higher proportion of children being supported by a smaller
proportion of adults, the total amount available is likely
to be smaller and more pupils will have to share it. Also
communities characterized by higher family incomes spend
more per pupil on education. The positive coefficient for
the revenue variable--levy per pupil--indicates that towns
that have a larger amount of tax revenue compared to the
number of students to educate will allocate a higher amount
of education expenditures per pupil than towns with a low
ratio.
The relationship this model specifies confirms the
belief that wealthy towns with good fiscal capacities and a
small number of students in relation to the total
population tend to spend a high amount on each student's
education. To the extent that per pupil expenditure is a
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surrogate for school quality, towns of this type are likely
to have high quality schools.
These variables constitute a very good model,
explaining over 82% of the variation in expenditures among
the communities in the sample. The inclusion of these
particular factors does corresponds to prevalant notions
about what influences school expenditures. According to
the model, wealth, revenue and demographic factors have an
important impact on the amount allocated to education.
However, what did not prove to be important does raise
questions about the appropriatenessof some commonly held
beliefs. School factors, and particularly private school
enrollment, did not prove to be the most useful predictors
of public school expenditures. The private school
enrollment variable was insignificant when added to the
best model. Further, no model including this variable
explained more of the variation that the model selected.
These results suggest that the private school enrollment in
a community does not have as powerful an effect on the
condition of the public schools as do other factors. Thus,
neither the improved quality theory nor the abandonment
theory is verified by the analysis.
The best model predicting the other quality variable--
percent of graduates attending private colleges--utilized
two of the same factors. Median family income and the levy
per pupil combined to explain 66.5% of the variation in the
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sample (R2 was .665). The dependency ratio proved to be an
insignificant factor. The estimated coeficients were as
follows:
Percent attending private colleges = -21.379
+.003(levy per pupil) + .001(median
family income)
Again all coefficients were significant at .01.
Thus, the two measures of public schools quality--per
pupil expenditures and the percentage of graduates
attending four-year colleges--relate to similar sets of
community characteristics. Both indicators are predicted
by the same wealth and revenue variables, showing that
wealthy communities with a good tax base are more likely to
provide high quality schools. Affluence and the revenue
generating ability of a community determine the quality of
education offered to public school students. Analysis of
the public school sector does not support either the
abandonment or the improved quality hypotheses concerning
the public and private school relationship.
Attempting to identify a comparable model to predict
private school enrollment did not result in such clear
conclusions. The following general model was fit:
Y=B(0)+B 1 (Q)+B 2 (R)+B 3 (S)+B 4 (T)+B 5 (U)+B 6 (V)+B 7 (W)+B 8 (X)
where Y = percent of students atending private schools
Q= median family income ($)
R = income per pupil ($)
S = median house price ($)
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T = levy per pupil ($)
U = dependency ratio
V = percent minority population
W = percent attending private colleges
X = per pupil expenditure ($)
None of the independent variables combined in any way to
explain a substantial amount of the variation. The model
that achieved the best results included three variables -
median family income, dependency ratio and the tax rate.
The estimated coefficients are as follows:
Percent private school enrollment = 10.910
+ .000(median family income)
- .861(dependency ratio) + .210(tax rate)
The variables included in this model are similar to those
important in predicting public school quality. However,
these wealth, revenue and demographic factors only explain
34.7% of the variation in the private school enrolllment
figures. Other factors account for over 65% of the
differences among communities in the private school
enrollment rates. No other model proved useful.
Evaluating the model chosen to predict expenditures in the
public sector as a predictor of private school enrollment
showed that the characteristics that affect the latter are
not useful in explaining the former. This model, with levy
per pupil, median family income and the dependency ratio,
explained only 29.8% of the variation, and the levy per
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pupil variable was not a significant factor.
The quite different results obtained in the two main
sections of the analysis suggest several conclusions.
First, little confirmation was found for the principles at
the foundation of much current discussion. Low
expenditures on public education do not relate to high
participation in private schools. Nor did high private
school enrollment affect the measured quality of public
schools. Thus, a competitive relationship does not seem
obvious from these data. Second, the data support the idea
that affluent and property-rich communities offer better
educational opportunties than poor and fiscally strained
towns. Third, the two elements of a community's
educational system--the public and the private sector--are
influenced by quite different aspects of the community.
The public institution, the data show, can be directly
related to measurable characteristics of the community:
demographic, fiscal and wealth factors. In contrast,
decisions to participate instead in the private sector do
not evolve from these elements. Rather, the proportion of
the school-attending population that elects private
education in a given community depends on factors that
escape measurement. Communities, it seems, have cultural
components that result in private enrollment patterns that
do not fit a general model.
Examination of some specific examples from the data
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illustrate this situation. Two contiguous towns, Lincoln
and Sudbury, that are relatively homogeneous in many ways
and, in fact, share the same high school, record private
school enrollment rates of 17.46% and 6.78% respectively.
Dover and Sherborn, two other towns in a similar situation,
show 19.35% and 11.38% rates of private school enrollment.
Even two communities with generally recognized high quality
schools, Newton and Lexington, do not have similar figures.
Newton sends 16.33% to private schools while Lexington
sends only 7.11%. The community in the SMSA with the
highest percentage attending private schools is not Boston,
the system that, many would argue, offers the lowest
quality public education. Nor is Stoughton, the community
with the lowest per pupil expenditure, as the abandonment
theory would predict, or Lincoln, the town with highest
expenditures, as the improved quality theory would predict.
Rather, the town of Milton, with almost one third of its
students in private schools, ranks first. No explanation
of Milton's percentage is obvious, particularly when
Belmont, a town that also has a prestigious private school
within its borders, reaches only just over a 10% figure.
Consideration of other characteristics illustrates
more of the complexity of the situation. The town that has
the highest median income and spends the second highest
amount per public school pupil (Weston) also participtes in
private education actively--19.15% of its students are in
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private schools. Stoughton, spending the smallest amount
per pupil, has a private school rate of only 4.04% Two
communities, both with below average median income and
house prices, Everett and Revere, differ by 100% in their
private enrollment figures.
The inability of these results to define clear
relationships in communities between public and private
schools does not terminate pursuit of at least some
understanding of the observed differences. Communities are
likely much more than the sum of their quantitative
characteristics. This aspect of a town, identified as its
culture, consists of beliefs, myths and values that serve
to guide behavior among community members. Development of
the elements of a town's culture may be influenced by
observable factors, but, in many instances, the culture,
although possible to describe, cannot be explained
adequately. Communities are simply different and this
difference shows up in the private school enrollment
patterns.
Differences of this kind are obvious to those who
"know" the town. With cultural knowledge of a community, it
is not difficult to predict, for example, whether the
private school enrollment rate will be high or low.
Despite the inability of statistical analysis to provide
answers, observors of the culture do not find it impossible
to explain why Belmont's figures are so much lower than
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Milton's. Once the explanation is formulated, it is
probably possible to find some data which confirm the
distinction. However, preferences for the public or
private sector are largely community-specific decisions
evolving from the culture of each particular locality.
Perhaps because of the resulting complexity, the beliefs
that operate in the relationship of public and private
schools are inconsistent and contradictory. Even if a
theory provides a reasonable explanation for a single
community, none apply generally. The importance of this
conclusion is that each of these beliefs serves as part of
the basis for the policy proposals directed toward the
private sector. Acknowledging the influence of cultural
factors in the variable of interest implies the need for a
reevaluation of these proposals.
VI Conclusion
The data presented do not indicate the obvious truth
of any of the commonly held beliefs about the relationship
between public and private schools. Even in the absence of
supporting evidence, however, those who believe in the
benefits of competition do not waiver. The exaltation of
competition as a remedy for public institutions requires an
underlying acceptance of a market philosophy and its
application to educational services. Strong belief in the
market model replaces the "scientific" evidence usually
required to support educational policy. Terrell Bell
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articulated this reasoning when, in response to sharp
questioning by Senator John Chaffee during hearings about
the existence of evidence to support the claim that
competitition will result in educational improvement, he
stated, "The President is simply expressing his belief in
the marketplace and how it gives an incentive to excel." 1 8 9
The question of whether education is a suitable area
in which to apply market principles did not originate with
the current administration. The use of competition to
improve education was an issue in Massachusetts in 1840
between those advocating increased state involvement in
education, led by Horace Mann, and a group opposed to
increased state responsibiliity, led by Governor Marcus
Morton. A legislative committee report on a bill to
abolish the state department of education stated strong
support for a free market approach to education. In
commenting on the academy system, the report asserted,
"There is a high degree of competition existing between
these academies, which is the best guaranty for
excellence...." 1 9 0 The committee described the framework
in which educational institutions should operate:
It is greatly to be feared, that any attempt, to
force all our schools and all our teachers upon
one model, would destroy all competition, all
emulati and even the spirit of improvement
itself.
Nor was the belief in the importance of competition
confined to Massachusetts. The identical issue arose in
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the debate over sectarianism in publicly provided schools
which led to the establishment of a separate Catholic
School system. According to Carl Kaestle, the inefficiency
of a public school monopoly and the benefits of competition
were used by various sides of the issue to attack the
Public School Society, which controlled all public funds
allocated to the charity schools. 1 9 2
The reappearance of a market framework today
corresponds to the shift in the view that education is
essential to the country's welfare. Although, for many,
the belief in the virtues of competition does approach the
level of religion, appropriateness of applying a free
market philosophy to education can be analyzed in a
relatively systematic fashion. Careful evaluation of this
application is important because the use of a market
framework continues to grow and the uncritical acceptance
of its philosophy could lead to misguided policy. For
example, a recent article by James Coleman, the author of
the study of private and public school achievement,
concludes that tuition for private education operates as a
tariff, protecting an inferior product (public education)
and harming those at the bottom of the income distribution
the most. 1 9 3 Others incorporate a consumer-producer
framework, advocating, for example, that public schools
adopt a "marketing plan" for the 1980's if they are to
remain competitive. 1 9 4 Clearly, the market metaphor has
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invaded the education policy arena. The data examined
suggest that the generally accepted perceptions concerning
education are not necessarily accurate; the relationship
between public and private schools does not seem to be a
simple one. Further analysis, then, is necessary to
determine whether any aspect of a market philosophy is
appropriately applied to educational insttutions.
Two types of evaluations of the market model
frequently appear with respect to its application to
education. One approach relies on an economic framework.
Typically, this analysis discusses whether the conditions
required for a market to function exist in the educational
arena. The conclusions of these studies, however, do not
often have an impact on either policy or the beliefs that
operate in its formulation. Despite the agreement of the
studies that the conditions for a market do not exist with
education, policies based on the market concept continue to
appear, and public faith in competition remains strong.
A second view of this issue avoids rigorous economic
analysis, concentrating instead on speculating what would
be the likely outcomes of implementing an educational
marketplace. With little empirical evidence upon which to
base conclusions, those pursuing this line of reasoning
often rely on comparisons with other institutions in which
a market system operates.
Most of the first type of evaluation conclude that
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almost all of the fundamental assumptions necessary for a
market system are violated with respect to education.
First, the nature of the output of the education process
presents several problems. As Daniel Sullivan points out,
"education is a very diverse and varied item."195 In
particular, because the output of education is a service
rather than a commodity, its measurement is very
difficult, even apart from the educational problems already
mentioned. Sullivan also presents two other important
ideas. The measurement of the quality of the educational
service is further complicated by the relationship of the
input or the consumer (the student) to the output. Judging
education by the level of student performance is thus
analogous to judging the quality of surgeons by the
survival rate of their patients, ignoring how seriously ill
they were when their physician started treatment. Further,
the inability to define the outcome of the education
process precisely makes it impossible to argue that
education "products" are homogeneous. 1 9 6
In addition, the absence of a well-specified
production function for education suggests that a market
metaphor is not appropriate. Producers do not have the
ability to control education production. As noted, the
consumer (student) plays an important role in the process.
Further, the teaching process is neither clearly defined
nor scientific. Learning theories, much like educational
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policy, are often contradictory.1 97
These characteristics also lead to another violation
of the market assumption: the need for complete and
accurate information. At several different levels, the
need for good information is not met in an educational
marketplace. The process of acquiring necessary
information is likely to be slow and costly to consumers.
Consumers also typically know even less than producers
about the nature of the education product. More important
is the fact that neither the producer nor the consumer
knows a great deal about the process of education. Jane
Hannaway describes the situation:
Professional education [producers] know more
about what goes on in schools, but the former are
usually unable to predict either the effect of
their effort -8 or the best way to proceed with
production.
If a market were to operate in this situation, inefficiency
would be the predictable result.
A basic assumption of any model employing competition
as a motivating force is that those participating in the
market will exhibit profit maximizing behavior. Two
deviations from this pattern exist in the educational
institution. Many private schools operate on a non-profit
basis and, therefore, are unlikely to use price adjustments
to respond to increased or decreased demand. Indeed, many
private institutions admit the same number of students each
year, without regard for changes in the demand for
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admission. Although many explanations are possible, the
desire to maintain the exclusiveness of private schools may
well rank higher as a motivating force than any interest in
showing a profit. 1 9 9
The second area in which a utility function may not
operate is in the nature of the benefits produced.
Whether the benefits of education at any given time are
principally private or public is a complicated question to
answer. The definitions of public and private, the
problems of measuring benefits that are clearly public and
the interrelationship of public and private benefits result
in the labelling of education as a "mixed good," with
little agreement as to how the mixture is structured. 2 0 0
Several of the characteristics of a hypothetical
educational marketplace suggest the likely conflict between
efficiency and equity. For example, the inability of the
poor and the poorly educated to obtain the information
necessary for efficient choices prevents the market from
operating efficiently for those people. Thus, existing
inequities will probably be duplicated. Some argue that the
efforts of the public schools to increase equity will be
undermined by any policy attempting to institute market
allocation:
Like anything else, relying on a market mechanism
for the distribution of educational resources
will surely result in more diversity among
institutions, (but probably less within them) and
may also lead to greater efficiency within the
educatiuonal sector as a whoe. But with reliance
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on external forces, the issue of equity...will be
slighted.... The social function performed by
common public schools is too important to be
jeopardized on the faint hope tha -e might make
education more cost-effective....
Thus, those who advance this argument against the market
system for allocating educational services are elevating
the importance of the public, rather than the private,
benefits of education.
Thus, the debate over the legitimacy of the
assumptions underlying the use of a market mechanism in the
education sector seems one-sided. Very few of those
advocating market remedies for the "problems" of education
address the issue of whether the necessary assumptions are
valid. Despite an often rigorous economic paradigm, many
studies implicitly assert belief in the existence of
competition and neglect the responsibility to subject this
underlying assumption to a similarly demanding scrutiny.
Investigations into the potential outcomes of market-
based policy proposals separate into two categories. One
type of study, within the framework of the market
assumptions, attempts to determine how education consumers
and producers will respond to market forces. For example,
Martha Jacob's study examined existing patterns of private
school enrollment by region, race and family income
concluded that Northern, white, wealthy individuals would
be most likely to benefit from tuition tax credits. 2 0 2
Besides ignoring the appropriateness of the
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assumptions, this type of research suffers from a lack of
empirical evidence upon which to base conclusions. It can
be argued that no implementation of a market system has
occurred in the provision of education in recent history.
(The Alum Rock, California, experiment involving
educational vouchers included a high degree of regulation
that made extrapolation extremely difficult. Further, the
small degree of success encourages many to ignore this
example203). Therefore, attempts to predict the behavior
that would result if any such system were enacted can only
be speculative. Further, any specific conclusions are
likely to be based on a significant number of faulty
assumptions about the appropriateness of a market
framework.
A second approach to the question of what would happen
if education were allocated by market mechanisms is to draw
analogies. This approach frequently leads to conclusions
about the likely negative consequences of market policies.
Because of the failure of economic arguments to focus on
the assumption of competition that underlies market
proposals, this approach could arguably be more effective.
For example, without conducting an exhaustive evaluation of
the assumption, George LaNoue pinpoints a fundamental
contradiction in it when he comments:
But which of the great American industries would
be a suitable model for the educational
marketplace? The "free enterprise"
transportation industry? Lockheed or Penn
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Central? How about the medical industry, now
financed in part by Medicaid vouchers, which do
not seem to have done much to improve the overall
health of Americans or even the fiscal solvency
of ho5?jtals, though some doctors are doing very
well?
Although some situations have changed since 1971 when this
comment appeared, the examples could easily be replaced
today by Chrysler, Amtrak and the National Football League.
Very few would argue that the system proposed for education
exists in pure form in other business sectors.
The emphasis of arguments of this type falls on the
public benefits of education and, in particular, the degree
of equity in the outcomes of education service delivery.
While acknowledging that "the public sector has failed the
poor in the efficient production and allocation of social
services," Henry Levin provides two specific examples that
illustrate that the private market does not exhibit any
better record. First, he cites two studies that
demonstrate that the same goods purchased in a poor
neighborhood cost 60% more than their price in a general
market. "The failure of the market to give rich and poor
access to privately produced goods and services should, in
itself, make us skeptical about applying it to
education." 2 0 5 A second related point is that, in a market
system, education producers establish schools in response
to the demand. Despite a likely demand for education in
poor neighborhoods, few producers of "high quality"
educational services will locate in low income areas.
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Levin's analogy makes the point rather dramatically,
"Not only is there no Saks Fifth Avenue in Harlem; there is
no Macy's, Gimbels, Korvettes or Kleins." 2 0 6 Levin also
cites the experience in Prince Edward County, Virginia,
when, in 1959, the county abolished its public schools and
provided each student with a tuition grant to attend
private schools. "While a system of private schools did
emerge to serve the needs of white students, no private
alternative became availability to black pupils." 2 0 7
Clearly the market system operated as badly as its critics
would predict; public benefits were ignored and only those
possessing the greatest resources were able to obtain the
private benefits.
The Alum Rock experiment does provide some support for
the argument that negative effects result from
implementation of market remedies for education. In
particular, the emphasis on private benefits and the
neglect of public benefits was revealed in the voucher
demonstration. David Cohen views this as a predicatable
consequence of allocating education by a private market:
[Tihey encourage competitive rather than
collective behavior. Consumers of most goods and
services, if they concentrate on anything at all,
concentrate on getting the best deal for
themselves. In the case under discussion here,
that would mean ensuring good education for their
own children, because under market competition
consumers would perceive the limited supply of
good schools. They would be most unlikely to
spend time organizing to assur 8 a good education
for everyone else's children.
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As the production of private benefits becomes the dominant
objective of education, those with money and choice will be
better equipped to win the competition for these private
goods.
One dimension of the consequences of a market policy
that receives very little attention is the long-term
effects of tuition tax credits and other market-oriented
policies. Assuming that the argument advanced by
proponents are legitimate, the intended effect of such
policies is improved quality of public schools due to the
necessity of competing with private schools for students.
If that effect were achieved, the question arises as to
what will happen after the quality gap is closed.
Logically, as the quality of public and private schools
becomes more equal, more students will tend to choose to
attend public schools, due to its lower price. Once that
shift takes place, what is the next step? The equilibrium
situation in this model is difficult to describe. Perhaps
that is the reason so few advocates or critics attempt to
articulate the possibilities. It is possible that the
entire framework, based on illegitimate assumptions, will
break down in the long run.
Thus, strong doubts exist as to the appropriateness of
employing the elements of the economic paradigm in
education policy. The economic assumptions required are
not valid; analogous situations do not predict acceptable
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outcomes; and the Massachusetts data suggest the
relationship between public and private schools is not
defined by competition. Yet the idea of the benefits of
competition continues to command strong support.
Perhaps one explanation for the persistence of this
belief is that competition does operate in the education
institution, but in a way very different from the usual
understanding. Because of the current focus of interest in
the economic purpose of education, the interest in pursuing
the private benefits of education has also increased.
Education has become a good for which people are willing to
compete. Clearly there are two sides competing in the race
for educational benefits. However, these two sides are not
the public and private sectors of education, as is usually
assumed. First, these two sides are not as separate and
distinct from each other as many perceive them to be.
Further, within each sector, large variations exist around
the type and quality of education. Second, some analysis
indicates that, within communities, these two institutions
are not in competition. At least, the existence of
competition is not obvious. Third, the two types of
education are not distinguished by the "quality" of their
output. The current belief that "private is better" does
not hold up under critical analysis. Indeed, even the
Coleman report, the most commonly quoted conclusion of
which was the superior achievement of private school
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students, recognizes that some public schools do match the
achievement levels of private schools. 2 0 9 The
identification of this sub-sector of public education helps
to delineate the actual sides of the education competition.
High-performance suburban high schools in wealthy
communities show substantial similarities to private
schools. What appears to be happening is that the
competition for educational benefits occurs between the
rich and the poor, with the poor, "lacking mobility,
education, income and access to capital"21 0 predictably
losing the race. The tradition of local provision of
schooling, combined within an implicit encouragement, by
public policy, of residential sorting, has allowed the rich
to employ the public institution to gain private benefits.
This situation, although it has its roots in past
practices, such as the charity schools, results from the
evolving emphasis over the past few years on the private,
rather than public benefits of education. As one observer
has noted: "While all parents struggle on behalf of their
own children, middle-income and white parents are better
able to press their interests (both in schools and in the
political arena) than are lower-income and minority
parents. Middle-income and white parents can more readily
"exit" from a school they dislike, moving to a new
neighborhood or placing their children in private
schools...." 211
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However, the question still remains as to why tuition
tax credits and similar proposals appeal to some when the
system described above allows an individual with sufficient
resources to obtain a high quality education at public
expense. It is possible that many feel that maximum
private benefits have been extracted from the public
institution as it exists. One perspective on this question
is that efforts to improve the equality of education in the
1960's and 1970's raised doubts "that the middle class and
the poor could both be served by the public school." 2 1 2
Whether the symptoms of "declining quality" in these high
quality public systems are real or perceived, the interest
in tuition tax credits becomes a logical extension of the
competition for private benefits. Believing that private
schools are now "better," individuals attempt to procure
the benefits of a private education. With the long
tradition of using public means to acquire private
benefits, it is reasonable to attempt to establish yet
another public policy that will allow the rich to obtain
more private benefits with public funds. Once again, the
policy represents a wealth transfer from the poor to the
rich.
Thus, the current debate about the relationship
between public and private schools seems to be irrelevant.
If public schools can simply be described as the "schools
of the people" and private schools as the "schools of some
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people,"213 the need for a redefinition of the debate
becomes clear. The "some people" who obtain high quality
education are primarily the rich, and their education
occurs in both public and private institutions (using more
traditional definitions). The schools that enroll the
remaining students, the poor, are also both public and
private. For example, inner city "private" schools that
once served immigrant Catholics now provide education for
minority populations. The argument can be made that these
private schools offer a higher quality education than the
public schools otherwise available to their students.
However, the education they provide, with their limited
resources, certainly does not equal that received by
students in prestigious boarding schools or even in
suburban Catholic schools. Attempting to define the
category of "some" people by including all those students
participating in "private" education does not seem
legitimate from this perspective. What does seem
reasonable to assert is that some students receive a "good"
education and those students are more often rich. The
insistence on determining whether that education is public
or private serves only to mask the wealth disparity that is
a systematic characteristic of education in the United
States.
Policy proposals that fail to acknowledge the critical
importance of the competition between rich and poor and
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concentrate instead on the imagined competition between
public and private education do not address the fundamental
problem of American education. As a result, such proposals
are unlikely to produce improvement in the overall
performance of all schools.
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